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________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
This projects sets out to explore the reasons why Greece, in the light of the current sovereign debt 
crisis, has not done as Argentina did in 2001 and defaulted. It uses a historical institutionalist 
framework, drawing on path dependency and critical junctures in the analysis of 1. how the 
European Union (EU) imposes restrictions on Greece, and 2. how Greece's and Argentina's 
situations correspond and differ. The project concludes that the main difference lies in the 
restrictions imposed on Greece by the EU, implemented through the agreement of the Maastricht 
convergence criteria. These criteria include demands for price stability, exchange rate 
stabilisation, nominal long-term interest rates and low government debts and deficits. They 
essentially remove Greek control of fiscal and monetary policies and are part of the reason for the 
sovereign debt crisis. Although Greece has been given further loans to pay their debt, the possibility 
that they will default is still very present, as they are currently in a negative debt-spiral where 
interest rates on their loans exceeds income, leading to constant negative growth with a variety of 
negative effects. 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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1. Introduction 
At the end of 2007, the world saw the rise of a global financial crisis - the crisis started as a bank 
crisis, emerging from the sub-prime crisis in the US and expanding to the rest of the world (Hodson 
et. al. 2009: 939). The bank crisis has had a spill-over effect and developed into national crises as 
governments felt compelled to give the banks financial aid-packages to help them overcome their 
financial squirmish (Helleiner 2010: 3; Schmidt 2010: 206). 
The financial crisis in the Southern European nation states
1
 has led to a crisis in the entire Eurozone 
(Schmidt 2010: 207). Several countries are experiencing huge national debts and substantial 
unemployment rates. Especially Greece is facing large challenges and is currently receiving bailouts 
from the Troika – the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - to save the economy and reduce the national debt (Schmidt 
2010: 199f. 
Taking the current global financial crisis as a starting point, this project seeks to unravel the 
sovereign debt crisis in Greece. This will be done through an analysis of Greece as a member of the 
Eurozone, and it will be clarified how the Maastricht convergence criteria of the EU have 
influenced Greece. Furthermore it will be covered how these criteria have influenced the Greek 
financial crisis. One focus in this project is on the four Maastricht convergence criteria and the 
interventions packages made by the Troika, since these are considered the main source of 
restrictions influencing Greece. This is not to say that it is only the EU that has had impeding 
effects on Greece, nor that the EU or Troika are the only actors influencing the current Greek 
situation. But the focus is deliberately placed here, as an explanatory factor. The approach will 
furthermore draw on knowledge from the Argentine default in 2001, which is used to compare the 
two crises in Argentina and Greece. This is done through an institutional theoretical perspective, on 
the basis of historical institutionalist framework.  
The situation in Argentine default in 2001 has on several occasions been compared to the current 
situation in Greece (Manolopoulos 2011; Nechio 2010). This appears to be a good case for 
comparison as Argentina and Greece appear to have followed somewhat similar trajectories since 
the Second World War. The countries have both had military juntas who justified their actions by 
                                                 
1
 Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. 
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being anti-communist; due to this anti-communist framing both military regimes were supported by 
the West (Manolopoulos 2011). Both countries have also had corrupted states, ruled by clientilism 
and huge public sectors, and they have both been seen as major actors in their respective region in 
comparison to their neighbours. Both countries have also pegged their currencies to a major hard 
currency, the dollar or the euro - Greece did not technically peg to the euro, but they agreed to the 
Maastricht Treaty and introduced the euro, which to some extent had the same effects as 
Argentina’s peg to the US dollar (Manolopoulos 2011). The pegs to hard currencies like this, led, in 
both cases to abandonment of monetary flexibility and authority, but without introducing necessary 
reforms. The peg in both cases led to what is termed a “financial honeymoon”, i.e. a false feeling of 
prosperity in the years following the pegs, but with massive losses in competitiveness and lack of 
structural reforms and a move away from clientilism. Finally, both countries have seen substantial 
debt crises and interventions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Manolopoulos, 2011).  
The solutions to the crises in the two countries have, so far, differed. Where Argentina chose to 
default and break their peg to the US dollar, Greece has not done the same with the euro, yet. 
Hence, it is interesting to ask why Greece did not devalue as Argentina did approximately one 
decade ago. 
Increasingly, economists agree that Greece must default in order to survive the financial crisis 
(Conley 2011). Accordingly, it is relevant to take a closer look at the macroeconomic structures of 
the Eurozone. Greece’s sovereign debt is massive, the unemployment is huge and it has a low 
degree of competitiveness - which are all reasons why a default could be a possible solution for 
Greece. A default would mean that the country declares bankrupt and suspends its payments of 
national debt. 
However, neither a default nor a devaluation are options for Greece as long as the country is a 
member of the Eurozone (180grader.dk 2012). The fact is that Greece has received several bailout 
packages from the Troika in order to reduce its enormous debt, and has in return been told to make 
substantial reforms and cuts in public spending, as this is collectively expected to create growth 
(Conley 2011). This leaves behind the question of why default is not deemed an appropriate 
solution for Greece by the EU, when one of the solutions in Argentina was to default. For this 
reason this project presents a descriptive analysis of the Argentine case, and will assess how this 
can be related to the situation Greece currently finds itself in. But before the comparison of 
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Argentina and Greece, the project moves to its first focus; an analysis of the Greek situation and 
how the macroeconomic framework of the Eurozone affects Greece.  
The above shows how multinational economic or political agreements can never remain purely one 
or the other, but will always mix and affect each other. By showing this interconnectedness of 
global economics with the politics of the Eurozone and domestically in Greece, this project places 
itself firmly within a global political economy perspective.  
 
1.1 Research problem 
 
1.2. Working questions  
In order to narrow down the research problem, the following working questions have been 
formulated. They further form the structure of the project. 
What were the causes of the Argentinean default and who were the major actors in the debt 
crisis? 
- Why was it possible for Argentina to default, and what were the structures and actors around the 
default?  
How has Greece from a historical institutional perspective been influenced by the Eurozone? 
- Which restrictions does EU membership pose on Greece? 
- What actors were influencing the introduction of the Maastricht, and how has this influenced 
Greece’s sovereign debt crisis? 
- What were the advantages for Greece and the EU to have Greece as a member of the Eurozone? 
How and why has the institutional context of the EU and the macroeconomic framework of the 
Eurozone affected Greece? And why has Greece not defaulted like Argentina did in 2001? 
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How can the crisis of Greece - as a member of the EU and Eurozone - be compared with 
Argentina from a political economic point of view? 
- How does the crisis in Argentina differ from the crisis in Greece? 
- Who were the actors, structures and processes? 
 
1.3. Structure of the project 
In order to answer the above questions, the project starts with a brief literature review, which 
mainly consists of considerations regarding used media and literature on the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis and problems encountered during data collection. Subsequently follows a theoretical chapter 
and a methodological chapter with theoretical introductions, considerations and implications. The 
following chapter introduces Argentina and attempts to answer the first set of working questions. 
Then Greece and some endemic indicators of structural weaknesses are presented, followed by an 
introduction to the EU and European Monetary Union (EMU) and their developments. This first 
section of chapters is followed by a second section of chapters including firstly an analysis of the 
restrictions being a member of the Eurozone poses on Greece, and secondly by an analysis of 
Greece and Argentina, attempting to answer why Greece has not defaulted as Argentina did. These 
two last sections are structured around the second and third set of working questions. Finally the 
project is concluded and the research question answered. 
 
1.4. Literature review 
The Greek sovereign debt crisis has been covered broadly in media and in academic literature. In 
this section the different literature used in this project is presented in order to get a clear picture of 
the qualities and characteristics of the literature and how the crisis has been considered differently.  
To a large part, the media has dealt with the Greek sovereign debt crisis within discourses of 
containment and guilt. With the primary topics being that the crisis in Greece must be stopped from 
spreading to other highly-indebted and fiscally unstable European periphery countries. Greece is in 
the media, to a large extent, portrayed as the focal point in the European crisis, and the assumption 
seems to be that if the crisis can be contained within Greece, it is only a matter of further borrowing 
10 
 
and internal reforms. Reform of the EMU’s structure, assumptions and prerequisites is mentioned, 
but not as a main cause. Thereby, the stability programmes given to Greece by the Troika, 
demanding privatisations and liberalising measures are seen as the solution, and enough of an anti-
dote, to stop the crisis from spreading to the rest of the Eurozone. The focus has often been on 
internal issues in Greece, including the corrupt political system, inefficient public sector, 
uncompetitive industrial sector and the dysfunctional tax system in Greece as explanatory factors to 
the sovereign debt crisis (e.g. guardian.co.uk 2011 A; independent.co.uk 2010 A; information.dk 
2009 A). Greece is generally faulted for having a dysfunctional political socio-economic system 
which has been destined for economic failure. For the most part the underlying structural issues of 
power inequality within the Eurozone countries are ignored as contributing factors to the overall 
problem (information.dk 2012). 
However, where a large part of the media blames domestic structures in Greece, scholars also point 
to faults within the Eurozone in both books and academic articles (Skaperdas 2011; Valiante 2011; 
Manolopoulos 2011 among others). Here the scholars include considerations on Germany's role in 
lending money to Greece, they include arguments on the core-periphery structure of the EU and the 
EMU, and they include arguments on how the structural programmes, further lending by the Troika, 
austerity demands and fiscal restrictions are not sustainable for the Greek situation.   
Add to this that to some scholars, the crisis is not as such seen as a concrete crisis between Greece 
and the Eurozone, but rather as a manifestation of a conflict between capitalism and democracy 
(Streeck 2011: 6f), or merely the beginning of the end of capitalism (Schwartz 2010; Ravenhill 
2011).  
Newspaper articles have been used to generate an understanding of the development of the crisis 
and how different countries as well as the institutions within the EU are said to situate themselves. 
However, these news articles have only to a limited extent been included in the references, as the 
scholarly articles were considered to be better at drawing out arguments and points as well as being 
more thorough. Newspaper articles are considered a matter-of-fact introduction to the current 
situation – although newspaper articles have given invaluable information and have still to some 
extent been included and considered throughout the project. 
In the collection of data and material, one potential challenge was encountered: The majority of 
both books and scholarly articles were written by, or drawing on Greek authors or experts such as 
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Manolopoulos (2011), Lapavitsas (2010) and Polychroniou (2011). This could be regarded as a 
problem as Greeks are often likely to be biased either strongly in favour of or against Greece, and 
thus not as nuanced as a by-standing observant like Lynn (2011) may be. However, as the Greek 
authors and experts used in this project were found to be writing for or cited in several 
acknowledged news papers of different national origin (The Times, The Financial Times, The 
Guardian, The Independent, Information and Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten to mention a few), as 
well as being economics professors at different well established universities outside Greece, they 
were found to be reliable sources. However, this potential bias has been considered throughout the 
project. Additionally, using Greek sources may offer more in-depth knowledge of the domestic 
structures as they naturally have experienced the Greek system at a close-up, they may further have 
worked with the Greek system for a long time and have a genuine interest in spreading knowledge 
about Greece. Excluding Greek scholars would further substantially limit the knowledge-base 
which could be drawn on for this project, and the project’s conclusions would be weakened as an 
effect of this. 
To gain a thorough understanding of Treaties, the convergence criteria and the EMU as a whole, 
there has been drawn on primary literature from the EU. This allows the project to analysis on the 
criteria from the EU, without already interpreted sources. And thus strengthens both the analysis 
and conclusion. 
In the comparison of the Argentine and Greek crisis, the project has also drawn on literature by 
Kindleberger (2011). As an economic historian Kindleberger (2011) contributes with an 
explanation of financial crises and defaults from a historical perspective.  This allows the project to 
touch upon crises from a global economy perspective. As the crises in Greece and Argentina are not 
the first of their kind, it becomes clear that there is a certain pattern between crises from a global 
and historical standpoint. 
Although the Greek sovereign debt crisis has been extensively reviewed both in comparisons with 
Argentina and in relation to the EU, the comparisons have typically been focusing on either the 
power relations within the EU, and Greece’s place in this; or on the similarities between Argentina 
and Greece (Manolopoulos 2011). The analysis of why Greece has not followed in Argentina’s 
footsteps and defaulted yet, including the power relations sustained in the convergence criteria and 
path dependent determinacy within the EU is, to our knowledge, a fairly untouched combination 
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within academic literature on the Greek sovereign debt crisis. Therefore this project places itself in 
the middle of two very analysed elements of the crisis; either the comparison with Argentina or the 
consequences of the EU’s institutional structure, and the project thus attempts to include them both 
to draw an analysis on Greek actions. 
In order to gain a thorough understanding of the underlying structures that may help explain the 
underlying structures of the EU which have influenced Greece. In the following chapter historical 
institutionalism is introduced in order to understand the theoretical framework for the analysis. 
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2. Historical institutionalism 
Exploring why Greece has not yet defaulted as Argentina did in 2001 (Kindleberger 2011: 156) can 
be approached from several theoretical directions. However, as the broader context as well as a 
view on processes over time is an inherent part of the analysis and approach in this project, 
historical institutionalism (HI) is preferred to, for instance, Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) 
and Sociological Institutionalism (SI).  
All three institutionalisms look at institutions, their origins and how they influence political 
behaviour. However, where RCI approaches actors and institutions as goal-oriented and with fixed 
preferences, decisions and as rational and cost-efficient focused solutions to existing problems, SI 
focuses primarily on social determinacy, norms and acceptance generated within institutions 
schooling individual actors to behave similar to actors from the same institution or culture (Hall and 
Taylor 1996). The third institutionalism, HI, has been approached differently by different scholars. 
Among others Pierson and Skocpol (2002) found that HI “...address big, substantive questions that 
are inherently of interest to broad publics as well as to fellow scholars” (p. 3). Furthermore HI 
“…develops explanatory arguments about important outcomes or puzzles.” At last they find that 
historical institutionalism is able to “… analyze macro contexts and hypothesize about the combined 
effects of institutions and processes rather than examining just one institution or process at a time.” 
Together these important features therefore contribute to our understanding of government, public 
policies and politics in for example EU (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 3). Additionally, HI operates 
with two approaches; the calculus and the cultural, thus taking the best of both RCI and SI in 
combination and adds to this path dependency to explain the origins of existing institutions and 
behaviour (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 3). 
The following is an introduction to HI and its advantages in comparison to RCI and SI, thus 
including argumentation as to why HI, and not RCI and SI, is chosen as the theoretical framework 
for this study. This is followed by a critique of HI. 
Hall and Taylor (1996) find three features that characterise HI, and which are considered important 
to our study of Greece as a member of the Eurozone. Firstly they emphasise that HI tends to 
conceptualize the relationship between institutions and individual behavior. Secondly, HI 
emphasize[s] the asymmetries of power associated with the operations and development of 
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institutions. And thirdly, Hall and Taylor state that HI tend[s] to have a view of institutional 
development that emphasizes path dependence (p. 939).   
These three points are crucial for the understanding of HI and how elements of HI are useful for 
understanding the Greek situation and role within the EU. Each of them is therefore scrutinised 
further in the following sections.  
 
2.1. Institutions 
HI defines institutions as …the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy (Hall and Taylor 1996: 
938). According to an HI understanding, institutions can range from standard operating procedures 
of a bureaucracy to norms that govern trade union behaviour or relations within the financial 
industry. Generally institutions are associated with rules or laws decided on by formal organisations 
(Ibid.). 
Hall and Taylor find that it is through the actions of individual actors that institutions have an effect 
on political outcomes. They generally assume that individuals seek to maximize the competence of 
a set of goals given by a specific preference function, and in doing so, behave strategically, which is 
to say that they consider all possible options to select those giving largest benefit (Hall and Taylor 
1996: 940). According to historical institutionalists the individual is seen as an entity embedded in a 
world of institutions, composed of scripts, symbols and routines that supply the filters for 
interpretation of both the situations and oneself, and a path of action is thereby constructed. In this 
way institutions not only provide strategic information, but also affect the identities, self-images 
and preferences of the actor. Historical institutionalists are eclectic in their work as they use two 
approaches to specify the relationship between institutions and actions. The first approach; calculus 
answers focuses on institutions affecting individual actions by changing the expectations an actor 
has about the actions that others are likely to take in response to or simultaneously with his or her 
own action. The second approach is cultural and tends to see individuals as satisfiers rather than 
utility maximizers and emphasize that choices of an action depend on the interpretations of a 
situation rather than on instrumental calculations (Hall and Taylor 1996: 940). 
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Historical institutionalists believe that conflict among rival groups for scarce resources lies at the 
heart of politics, and do actually accept this. But simultaneously they search for better explanations 
for the distinctiveness of national political outcomes and for the inequalities that marked these 
outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996: 937). Historical institutionalists found some of these answers in 
the way that institutions of the economy and polity structures conflict as to benefit some interest 
and not others, and they see institutional organizations as the primary factor structuring collective 
behaviour and generators of distinctive outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996: 937). 
Historical institutionalists have always paid close attention to the state, which they see as a complex 
of institutions capable of structuring the character and outcomes of group conflict (Hall and Taylor 
1996: 938). Much of the HI work has focused on cross-national comparisons of public policy, often 
emphasizing the impact of national political institutions structuring relations among legislators, 
organized interest, the electorate and the judiciary. Among other things the financial systems have 
been extensively analyzed (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938).  
 
2.2. Power 
In the second element historical institutionalists have been aware of the way institutions distribute 
power unevenly across social groups. They assume that institutions give some groups 
disproportionate access to the decision-making process and they stress how some groups lose while 
others win (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939).  
HI is capable of analysing power relations, by demonstrating how power inequalities are 
strengthened by and often embedded in institutions and organizations. In many cases the power 
inequalities are even able to invade the political understanding (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 7). 
Historical institutionalists investigate balances of power and resources, and understand institutions 
as developing products of struggle among unequal actors (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 12).   
For historical institutionalists institutions and organizations thus exist in a world of asymmetric 
power relations, and at the same time they reject that the same institutions will behave equally in 
other political systems, since this will dependent on the context. They believe that you can only 
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understand the rules and how actors act when you know their history, which is an important task in 
the analysis on EU and Greece (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 12). 
Typically, historical institutionalists do meso- and macro-level analyses which examine multiple 
institutions in interactions and which are influenced by broader contexts (Pierson and Skocpol 
2002: 12). They pay attention to ways that institutional processes intersect with one another, often 
creating unintended openings for actors, which then triggers political changes (Ibid.). Historical 
institutionalists rarely focus on single institutional or organizational cases, instead they typically 
analyse how organisations and institutions relate to each other and shape the processes and 
outcomes of interest (Ibid.), in our case how the EU has influenced Greece.  
Historical institutionalists also approach the problem of explaining how institutions originate and 
change insisting that new institutions are created or adopted in a world already replete with 
institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 953). HI focuses on the way in which the power relations 
present in existing institutions give some actors or interests more power than others over the 
creation of new institutions, which will be very important in our analysis of the Maastricht 
convergence criteria (Ibid.). Contrary to RCI, however, HI expands on this notion of power 
inequality within organizations by introducing path dependency, using history, previous power 
relations and existing institutional patterns to explain current power relations and the processes of 
institutional creation and reform (Hall and Taylor 1996: 953). 
 
2.3. Path dependency 
The third point is important for our analysis of what impact EU has had on Greece. This element 
rejects the traditional hypothesis that the same setting will generate the same results everywhere, 
which applies to our comparison of Argentina and Greece. This path dependent causation favours 
the view that the effect of such powers relations is communicated by the individual features of a 
given situation, which are often inherited from the past. Institutions are seen as persistent features 
of the historical landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical development along a 
set of ‘paths’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 941). Historical institutionalists emphasize the impact of 
existing state capacities and policy legacies followed by policy choices, which is essential in our 
analysis of how EU has influenced Greece (Hall and Taylor 1996: 942). 
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HI tracks patterns of political development across countries, arguing that timing and junctures of 
particular events or processes do matter (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 7), simultaneously they seek to 
unfold causal processes and important outcomes over a long period of time. This is particularly 
when focus is on macro processes, and here interest is often on structural pre-conditions for 
particular outcomes (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 9).  
Since institutions are strongly path dependent, according to historical institutionalists, institutions 
are not easily scrapped when conditions change; which means that institutions will likely have a 
varied quality (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 14). When new initiatives are introduced to address 
contemporary demands, historical institutionalists see them as adding to rather than replacing pre-
existing institutional forms. Pierson and Skocpol (2002) therefore find that institutions will rarely 
look like optimal solutions to present collective action problems (p. 14).  
Hence, in HI focus is on organisational structures and attention is paid to long-term processes and 
critical junctures. This helps to understand the overall context and the interacting processes shaping 
and reshaping states, politics and public policy making (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 1).  
Historical institutionalists divide the flow of historical events into periods of continuity punctuated 
by critical junctures, i.e. moments when substantial institutional change happens and in this way 
creating a ‘branching point’ from which historical development moves onto a new path (Hall and 
Taylor 1996: 942).  
 
2.4. Critical Junctures 
Pierson and Skocpol (2002) believe that junctures are ‘critical’ since they place institutional 
arrangements on paths that are then very difficult to change (p. 7). In this way path dependency is a 
crucial causal mechanism for HI, and nearly all path dependent processes are constituted by the 
critical junctures (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 242). In HI critical junctures are characterized by a 
situation, in which structural influences on political development are significantly relaxed for a 
relatively short period, which ends up with two main consequences: 1. the range of plausible 
choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially, and 2. the consequences of their 
decisions for the outcome of interest might be more significant. Historical institutionalists refer to 
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the moment of institutional formation as one in which “small events can have huge impact in terms 
of selecting a resilient and self-reproducing institutional equilibrium (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 
243). An example of a critical juncture could be the case of Argentina, where Perón introduced 
clientilism and favoured certain interest groups and business oligarchs (See section 4, page 21 on 
Argentina). Perón’s use of clientilism manifested itself in the system, and made it a recurring 
element during Menem’s time as president, even though he undertook privatisation reforms and 
attempted a general reform in Argentina. Another historical event could be the preparation of the 
Delors Report, which was the background of the Maastricht convergence criteria, which have had 
large impact on Greece, and which were mainly influenced by core countries. See section 6.1.1. 
Since heightened contingency is a core characteristic of critical junctures, counterfactual analysis 
and narrative process tracing are particularly important and must be explicitly employed to study 
them (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 247). The analysis of critical junctures requires two things. 1) 
The narratives should specify not only the decisions and actions that were taken but also those that 
were considered and ultimately rejected. 2) The narratives should reconstruct the consequences of 
the decisions that were taken and (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 257). However, in this project 
counterfactual analysis has been omitted, as it has not been possible to find empirical evidence of 
these close-call counterfactuals. 
Pierson and Skocpol (2002) emphasize how the once established patterns of political mobilization 
become the “rule of the game” and generate self-reinforcing dynamics. Arguments on path 
dependency can this way help us understand the causal relationship and find the root cause of the 
power inequality that characterises many aspects of political development (p. 7). 
Pierson finds that a critical juncture should have a duration that is short compared to the path-
dependent process it initiates. In long-term critical junctures there may be a tipping point, which is a 
point where the rising cause finally passes a threshold and leads to a fast change in the outcome, a 
change that cannot be subverted. Here it is important to remember that a critical juncture is not a 
tipping point (Pierson in Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 351).  
A majority of scholars have analysed the process of EU’s constitutionalisation, where a treaty-based 
organisation has been transformed into a quasi-federal polity, and one of the conclusions is that the 
constitutionalisation of EU law has followed a path-dependent, self-reinforcing process (Capoccia 
and Keleman 2007: 366). We can indentify critical junctures when actors have made choices that 
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set the EU system on a path to the outcome we see today in the European Union. Some of the 
critical junctures here are: institutional provisions inserted in the Treaty of Rome, the introduction 
of qualified majority voting, and non-events such as moments when powerful national governments 
chose not to confront the European Court of Justices (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 366), and many 
more. In our analysis we have chosen to focus on the Maastricht convergence criteria, since these 
criteria have had large impact on the economic development of Greece.   
Hall and Taylor (1996) find a problem with critical junctures and ask for an explanation of what 
precipitates critical junctures (p. 942). They state that there are no clear answers to this question 
other than historical institutionalists generally stressing the impact of economic crisis (Ibid.). 
Summarizing this chapter HI makes use of path dependency, power and critical junctures as 
explanatory factors for how institutions look and work. As these are the elements used throughout 
the analysis the above presentation has included how path dependency, power and critical junctures 
are operationalised in the analysis. These are not the only elements in an HI approach, but these 
particular elements have been emphasised as they carry particular relevance for the project at hand. 
As the previous chapter has introduced HI, RCI and SI the following chapter focuses on why HI is 
deemed most appropriate for the analysis. This is followed by a section on how the theory will be 
applied in the analysis. 
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3. Methodology  
Building on the previous chapter, where Historical Institutionalism (HI) was introduced, the 
following chapter presents arguments as to why HI is more appropriate for the analysis than its 
fellow institutionalists; Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and Sociological Institutionalism 
(SI). This is followed by a section on criticisms and downfalls of HI. Subsequently is a section on 
how HI is operationalised in the analysis. 
 
3.1. Advantages in Historical Institutionalism 
Most analyses of the Eurozone crisis are couched in the formal language of economics. This project 
addresses this dimension, but also attempts to delve deeper, and include considerations of the 
historical background of the institutional framework and the particular decisions made.  
HI is chosen as the theoretical framework of the project for a number of reasons. Among others 
because of the attention the theory puts on contexts and configurations of history, but also temporal 
arguments and emphasis on generalisability of big issues. 
As we presume that being a member of the EMU has substantial impact on the actions available to 
Greece both in their current situation and dating back, using HI as the theoretical approach, offers 
value to the analysis. The concept of path dependency fits well with the institutional set-up where 
EU was made in a certain image of cooperation and trade, a set-up that will still affect how the 
European member states and the European institutions can act as responses to a crisis today. 
HI offers a broader view; by combining path dependency with critical junctures and triggering 
points, the theory allows for recognition of the long-term restrictions that being a member of the EU 
can pose. Restrictions that may be in place because of events and decisions taken before Greece 
became a member. This is for instance the decision and mutual promise between European member 
states that they adhere to the convergence criteria, or the power balances implicit between the 
European member states with a core in Germany and France and periphery with the newly included 
countries in Eastern Europe. This idea of path dependency further implies that preferences are not 
assumed to be exogenously given, unlike in RCI. Actors are thought of as powerful and with 
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preferences somewhat formed by the institutional setting they make part of. Actors’ behaviour is 
thus somewhat determined by their institutions and how institutions have developed, and in this 
way HI appears more commodious than both RCI and SI. RCI is best at explaining how institutions 
were created, where SI better explain actors’ behaviour. 
 
3.2. A question of underlying assumptions and lack of spaciousness 
In the following RCI and SI is introduced a little further in order to substantiate on the arguments 
for HI as the theoretical framework. 
At the core of SI lies the interest in cultural implications and the social legitimacy of institutions. SI 
works from the premise that actors are socialised, or schooled, into the institutions they work or 
take part in, thus they adopt the norms inherent in existing institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 948-
9). This means that when actors make decisions, they are governed by a logic of appropriateness; 
they evaluate the situation in consideration of what they should do. SI focuses on individuals as 
moral actors, whereas in the following analysis actors do not have to be individuals, but can also be 
political parties, institutions, countries, legal frameworks etc. Although HI does not completely rule 
out the role of culture and socialisation, HI has devoted less attention to developing an 
understanding of exactly how institutions affect behaviour, instead of the eclectic and incorporate 
elements of both RCI and SI in their approach (Hall and Taylor 1996: 950). In the analysis of why 
Greece has not reacted to a financial crisis as Argentina did SI does not offer a sufficiently 
comprehensive theoretical framework, as actors’ moral decisions are not the primary focus in this 
project.  
RCI and SI are both focused on which framework institutions are setting for actors’ behaviour. 
Contrary to the rational choice approach HI does not see institutions as being the result of actors’ 
rational calculations. HI recognises, as RCI, that there are logics that govern individual behaviour, 
but in HI the assumption is that it is the institutions’ path dependency that set limits and 
possibilities when making decision. This differs from RCI where the explicit assumption in is that 
all consequences of a given path are predictable. RCI looks very narrowly at one case at one point 
in time and one process to analyse, and attempt to generalise from this (Ibid. 950). Preferences and 
goals are exogenously given, and actors choose certain paths based on these preferences and 
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because they are the most cost-efficient and serves their goal best (Hall and Taylor 1996: 951). 
However, this approach seems rather simplistic as choices often entails unexpected and unintended 
consequences that are difficult to change, and do not have a purely rational explanation. Further, HI 
accommodates our level of analysis better by incorporating the historical reasons, through path 
dependency, for certain behaviour as well as allowing for unpredicted events to be included in the 
analysis.  
Thus all three institutionalisms have certain assumptions about how decisions are made and how 
changes are then likely to come about. RCI is more calculus oriented, assuming that actors are 
rational and goal-oriented. This rather simplistic approach omits the influence previous decision 
may have on current behaviour, additionally RCI tends to explain the existence of institutions by 
their consequences. SI focuses more on appropriate behaviour, and views decisions as a result of 
socialisation of the individual into an institutions. Thus, all three branches of institutionalism 
believe that decisions are made by individuals and that these individuals organize themselves and 
take part of groups, alliances etc., such as the ECB, EU or the Greek government, because they 
hereby seek to achieve goals, which are either individual or collective (Hall and Taylor 1996: 
943ff.).  
HI attempts to include the “best of both worlds”. HI both attempts to include the highly 
instrumental and well-modelled approach of RCI and a more explanatory dimension of institutions 
and behaviour that SI represents. Adding to this is the concept of path dependency, which allows 
for inclusion of the unexpected and a more in-depth understanding of certain decisions.  
 
3.3. Criticism of historical institutionalism  
Having established that HI is the most appropriate theoretical framework for the analysis, the 
following section considers some criticisms of HI.  
Historical institutionalists are typically motivated by problems or issues happening in the real-
world, where the issues bear clear substantive importance to the listener. This means that real-world 
issues become inherently important and the object of analysis often lead to historical 
institutionalists combining theoretical insights and stretching the limits of methodological creativity 
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in order to gain influence on those issues (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 21). Although eclecticism is 
one of the elements of HI that was highlighted as an advantage, - if not used rigorously it can also 
be a disadvantage. If used loosely, eclecticism can lead to selection bias, i.e. choosing the direction 
that fits best with the collected data, this implies that the cases are not randomly selected which 
decreases the statistical value and validity (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 17). This could for instance 
happen, as mentioned by several scholars (Keohane 1994; Hall and Taylor 1996; Capoccia and 
Kelemen 2007) if near-misses and negative cases are omitted. This happens as a consequence of the 
predisposition to analyse positive cases, i.e. cases where the phenomena of interest has occurred 
(Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 17). Therefore attention has to be paid to alternative choices available 
to the decision makers (Cappocia and Kelemen 2007: 369). Essentially Greece had no influence on 
possible alternatives at the initiation of the EMU – this is elaborated in the analysing chapters. Near 
misses imply another potential problem, but as mentioned data for near-misses has not been 
possible to find, and the interest lies on the change that has happened, near-misses are not included 
in this project. 
HI analysis usually seeks to consider the effects of institutions while holding other variables 
constant (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 10). The problem here is that the variables influencing 
institutions are partially the long-term consequences of institutional structures, and the impact of 
institutional structures on the politics of the welfare state can therefore be misread. If attention is 
not paid to these slow-moving dimensions of social life the role of e.g. the impact of slowly-built 
pressures, such as fiscal overload, might be ignored. Explanations may thus focus on triggering 
factors rather than the deeper causes and the identification of important political questions since the 
relevant outcome happens too slowly to be discovered analytically (Ibid.), which means that they 
might miss important features that also influence the outcome. This should be held in mind when 
conducting the analyses. 
HI faces a potential problem, as researchers often look at small-n. A small amount of cases can 
complicate testing hypotheses, and thus a small n can decrease generalisability and validity of the 
results. However, according to Pierson and Skocpol (2002), it has been best practice in previous 
research to test hypothesises with comparisons between “positive cases” with “negative cases” (p. 
18). For the purpose of this analysis, Argentina constitutes such a positive case, where a national 
decision to default in the case of a sovereign debt crisis, and Greece is considered a negative case, 
as they have not defaulted within the time frame of this study. And although it is not possible to 
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infer from these two cases to all cases of sovereign debt crises, the closer scrutiny adds to existing 
knowledge on which restrictions the European Union explicitly and implicitly poses on their 
member states.  
A point to have in mind when using this methodology is that a historical moment that constitutes a 
critical juncture for one institution may not constitute a critical juncture for another. For instance: 
an episode identified as a critical juncture for a country’s party system may not be a critical juncture 
for its overall regime type or system of interest intermediation (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 249).   
The next section discusses how HI is used in this project. 
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4. Argentina 
The following chapter presents a short historical review of what has happened politically in 
Argentina since the Second World War, and hence the historical roots of the Argentine crisis in 
2001 are identified. Furthermore the chapter contains an outline of the actors and structures, which 
have played a part in the country's default. 
When one considers Argentina's post-World War period in a political and historical perspective, 
one cannot ignore Juan Domingo Perón who was elected as Argentina’s president in 1946. Perón's 
policy has been regarded as a 'third way' during the cold war between USA and USSR. 
Protectionism, patriotism and nationalisation were key components in Perón's ideology 
(Manolopoulos 2011: 5). 
The regime under Perón is often described with the term ‘Peronism.’ Furthermore Perón attempted 
to initiate industrialisation, namely car manufacturing and aircraft construction, through 
nationalised initiatives (Manolopoulos 2011: 5). As many others predicted, Perón failed to create 
industrialization during the nine years he was acting as Argentina’s president. This is not as such a 
surprise; - in for example North America industrialization took decades. Instead Perón created 
disbursement of funds rather than wealth. According to Manolopoulos (2011) the problem with 
Peronism that Argentina closed in on itself instead of remaining open, and thereby created a 
breeding ground for conglomerates and clientilism, while simultaneously destroying all 
entrepreneurism. The concept clientilism can be described as favours from politicians to interest 
groups to capturing and secure their support and votes (p. 7). 
After several failures to develop Argentina's economy, it all broke out in a military coup in 1955, 
however clientilism continued steadily. Between 1955 and 1983 the population suffered under 
shifting dictatorships and a military regime, the so-called 'junta', under which Argentina 
experienced economic decline (Manolopoulos 2011: 1ff). 
To put things in relief, Argentina's economic situation in the 1950 corresponded to the healthy 
economic situations in Canada and Australia, furthermore was Argentina the most advanced 
economy in Latin America and posed as a vast contrast to the lesser developed neighbouring 
countries (Manolopoulos 2011: 6f).  But Perón and the following dictators had a tendency to follow 
Peronism and were nationalistic and protectionist and as a result of that not very innovative and 
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competitive. Additionally, different interest groups and businessmen received huge direct assistance 
from the state as a form of clientilistic agreement. Clientilism, which has permeated Argentina’s 
ruling class as well the political life since Perón, is further elaborated later in this chapter.  
After decades of military humiliation, the dictatorship collapsed and formal democracy returned in 
1983. From 1984 to 1989 Argentina recorded massive popular strikes; people wanted higher wages, 
and business groups and farmers were asking for favours. Raul Alfonsin was president from 1983 
during the return to democracy, in this period debt led to hyperinflation. The term hyperinflation 
indicates that there is a huge rate of inflation with increasing prices on several hundred percent 
yearly (Manolopoulos 2011: 8f). Hyperinflation occurs when the rate of inflation has reached a 
point where the currency begins to lose its function as means of payment (denstoredanske.dk 2012). 
Instead, a country uses a foreign currency as a means of payment – in the case of Argentina, they 
used dollars. The cause of hyperinflation is often that a huge amount of public budget deficit is 
financed through the printing of more money. A fast growing amount of money leads to increasing 
inflation and with a high level of inflation the trust in the monetary system will fall (Ibid.), and thus 
the interest rate will raise and foreigners will not risk lending money to the country. 
In Argentina debt rose from 14 percent of GDP to 66 percent between 1975 and 1989, and most of 
it rose during Alfonsin’s presidency. At this point, and as a consequence of decades of devastating 
dictatorships and extended clientilism, Argentina was highly dysfunctional and corrupted 
(Manolopoulos 2011: 8). 
Because of the massive public debt and hyperinflation, Argentina pegged its currency to the dollar 
in 1991, this led to superficial economic success and real losses of competitiveness, as there was a 
lack of crucial structural reforms, such as a labour market reform to build a strong currency. By 
pegging it's currency to the dollar, Argentina had relinquished its monetary flexibility. However, the 
dollar was weak for the most part of 1990s, which was an advantage for the Argentine export 
(Manolopoulos 2011: 15). 
At this time an intervention from the IMF was initiated with a new different political course than 
what had been the case since Perón. Argentina changed course to the so-called 'Washington 
Consensus', which was influenced by American policies (Manolopoulos 2011: 4ff). The 
Washington Consensus-programme included large privatisation programmes, exchange rate 
programmes and abandoned tariffs. Thus, this was an anti-inflation and neo-liberal monetary policy 
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and a policy in contrast to protectionism and nationalism. However high-ranking politicians 
continued to gain revenue from oil, soya export and borrowings from the capital market, yet again 
to favour interest groups and thereby capturing votes. Hence, rent-seeking and bribery seemed to be 
ignored by policymakers from the IMF (Ibid.).       
One of the intentions with the privatisation programmes was to improve economic efficiency. For 
Argentina, the privatisation had both pros and cons. For instance the privatisation of the telephone 
system led to enormous investment and innovation, which resulted in service improvement, 
benefiting most population groups. Unfortunately businessmen (i.e. agents) exploited the 
privatisation through corruption and for instance created a monopoly of the postal services 
(Manolopoulos 2011: 9).  Along with the privatisation programmes, there was strong willingness 
among international lenders, such as the IMF to provide loans. Still the necessary reforms were not 
implemented, and the foreign capital was essentially used to hand out favours, instead of investing 
in future capacity to boost the country's economy (Ibid.: 17).         
An important domestic structure is clientilism, as mentioned, as there is certainly a strong link 
between clientilism, rent seeking and bribery in the case of Argentina, which has permeated the 
country's economy for decades. Actors engaging in clientilistic agreements do contribute to the 
Argentine economy (Manolopoulos 2011: 5f). Clientilism is strongly linked to Peronism, and to 
understand this phenomenon one has to look at the hyperinflation of the 1980s and the currency peg 
in the 1990s, plus the lack of reforms in this decade. These elements have helped manifest 
clientilism and corruption and more or less institutionalising them in the Argentine structure (Ibid.). 
Business oligarchs are described as entrepreneurs, who own or run large conglomerates, and these 
actors’ political and economic power is very significant, as they are owners of TV stations as well 
as newspapers; their impact on politicians and the public opinion is comprehensive. Besides from 
this, they have their own banks which means that they are not economically dependent on other 
agencies or agents. Furthermore, these ruling businessmen are well organised and are able to 
negotiate favours and manipulate the system (Manolopoulos 2011:11).    
The Argentine debt kept on rising throughout the 1990's, consisting of external and domestic debt 
both in the public and the private sector. The colossal accumulation of debt since 1998 is the reason 
why recession eventually transformed into a depression in 2001. As a consequence, the 
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unemployment rose to 25 percent of the working population, and if the underemployment is 
included the number increased to 50 percent (Lischinsk 2003: 81).  
Most of the domestic debt of the Argentine state was contracted in dollars, while it was received in 
Argentine pesos, in order to increase the security to local lenders in relation to the potential 
currency default. At this point a so-called bi-monetary convertibility system was established, which 
allowed the Argentine pesos to be converted into US dollars (Ibid). Given that the local debt was 
contracted in dollars and received in pesos, was essentially the tipping point that trigged the crisis in 
2001 and the depreciation of the peso (Kindleberger et al. 2011: 233; Lischinsk 2003: 81). 
As part of the convertibility system, the dollar was only present in the banking system as a virtual 
currency, thus the banks continued to only receive actual money in pesos. At the time the crisis 
broke out, clients tried to withdraw their deposits, but the banks could not disburse these deposits 
because there were no dollars available (Lischinsk 2003: 91). 
The government of Argentina in December 2001 made it official that it would default on its public 
debt, and in start 2002 the fixed exchange rate regime (the convertibility system) was abolished, this 
led to a devaluation of the currency (Porzecanki 2012:1). 
By taking a historical perspective, the Argentine crisis did not come alone. Since the early 1980's 
the world has seen several monetary disasters, more than ever before have national banking systems 
collapsed. There have been massive loan losses of banks in Europe, Southeast Asia, North- and 
South America (Kindleberger et al. 2011: 278). 
The years before the Argentine crisis, Southeast Asia (Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia and the 
Philippines) in 1997 and Russia in 1998, experienced crises with similar patterns, e.g. that banking 
and currency crises emerged together (Kindleberger et al. 2011: 278). The depreciation, which 
occurred in Thailand in the summer of 1997, spread and trigged devaluations in other Asian 
countries as well as Russia and Argentina. The global economy has thereby through an external 
shock, to some extent, affected the economic situation in Argentina which makes the link both 
between politics and economics as well as the financial interconnectedness across the globe very 
apparent (Kindleberger et al. 2011: 156). In all the above-mentioned crises the countries involved 
have received a large loan from the IMF and depreciated either before or after it was received 
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(Kindleberger et al. 2011: 234). In 2000 the IMF provided a huge loan to Argentina despite the fact 
that at the time, it seemed unrealistic for Argentina to maintain its peg to the dollar (Ibid.). 
 
4.1. Role of IMF and other international actors 
During the 1990's before the default as well as during the crisis, the IMF's target has been to give 
the authorities within Argentina fiscal advice and economic support (Nechio 2010: 4). There is little 
doubt that the IMF through its supporting programmes has had tremendous impact on Argentina's 
fiscal policy course as a whole. Accordingly a big part of the responsibility falls back to the IMF, as 
they failed to provide sufficient support to reduce the public debt and avoid the default (Nechio 
2010: 4; Geithner 2003: 63). IMF erred among other things in its assessment of the Argentine 
economy by overestimating its growth potential and underestimating its vulnerabilities, as a result 
the support programmes were insufficient, especially through 1998 (Nechio 2010: 4).  
IMF advised the government on a large number of fiscal areas, but at the end of the day IMF did 
little beyond expressing concerns on the outcome as long as the loan was reimbursed. The result 
was, in cases when Argentina did not deliver on IMF's recommendations the Fund did not react 
further on the issue (Geithner 2003: 63ff). On the other hand, it is important to point out that it was 
the authorities within Argentina who essentially were taking the final decisions on their fiscal 
policies. For instance was it the sovereign government who decided to implement the exchange rate 
regime, despite IMF's doubts of its viability and its effect on the remaining domestic policies 
(Ibid.). Hence the IMF did not dictate its policy, but rather encouraged and provided advice. 
However, critics have pointed out that the IMF did not follow up on Argentina’s compliance to the 
IMF criteria of neo-liberal policies (Geithner 2003: 66).  
On the fiscal area the IMF ignored repeated slippages of debt and deficit targets. Additionally the 
Argentine government underperformed in proportion to the expected growth and fiscal targets. This 
meant that the timeframe for restoring a fiscal surplus was repeatedly postponed on the basis of 
what turned out to be far too optimistic growth assumptions (Geithner 2003: 63ff).  
The IMF experienced pressure among its shareholders and within the international community that 
the situation in Argentina would deteriorate if the Fund did not continue its inspections.  
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4.2. Why did Argentina default? 
The main reasons to the default:  
1. Argentina pegged the peso to the dollar in order to stabilise inflation, meanwhile the peg 
led to overvaluation of the peso, which made Argentina uncompetitive (Buckley 2009: 10). 
At the time Argentina pegged its currency to the dollar, the IMF encouraged labour market 
reforms and fiscal austerity to stabilize the economy. However at this crucial point the 
President in power Carlos Menem refused to make this pivotal reform (Manolopoulos 2011: 
6), among other things no spending cuts were made in order to stop the rising government 
deficit (Manolopoulos 2011: 23).  
2. The enormous amount of foreign capital inflow, to finance budget and reduce the debt. The 
massive deficit occurred through an economic boom from borrowed foreign capital. 
Schedule of debt repayment and high interest rates that have to be paid for refinancing of 
overdue debt, which Argentina could not afford to pay back.  
3. The phenomenon of corruption was considered a major part of Argentina's economic 
problems (Buckley 2009:10).  
4. Risk assessment companies increased the estimated risk of investments in Argentina, thus 
initiating a spiral that caused an interest rare hike, which they then charged for refinancing 
facilities 
5. IMF borrowed money, but did not enforce conditions and penalties.  
6. Exports doubled from 1993 to 1998, the fixed and overvalued rate of exchange fostered 
import, which more than doubled in those years. 
7. Neither politicians nor the bank sector (including IMF) could provide a timely exit from the 
Convertibility regime. One could argue that the Convertibility model was necessary to 
achieve stability after hyperinflation processes in 1989 and 1990, the problem with the bi-
monetary system was that it allowed depositors to make local deposits in dollars and 
contract the rent in dollars. Plus the government could assume internal debt in dollars in 
exchange of pesos, in this way no money could be issued internal to provide liquidity, and 
instead monetary restriction were overcome by debt bonds (Lischinsk 2003: 93f).  
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5. Introducing Greece 
Before turning to the EMU, the crisis and the analysis of the European restrictions on Greece, it is 
important to approach the endemic indicators and weaknesses of the Greek state and the systemic 
underpinnings that may have had effects on the current situation in Greece.  
According to Manolopoulos (2011) the deficiencies within Greece all starts with history, dating 
back to the Ottoman occupation (pp. 59-79) and are thus seen as a path dependent cycle. Following 
this line of thought, maybe it is the Greek nemesis that is currently punishing Greece for its hybris 
and exaggerated pride and reliance on being a big nation bringing democracy to the world 
(Manolopoulos 2011: 62). However, although history undoubtedly has played its toll on the Greek 
situation, it is not necessary to go back to the time of the Ottoman Empire to gain an understanding 
of some inherent inefficiencies in Greece. The following is a short historical review which 
simultaneously presents some endemic weaknesses of the Greek state. 
 
5.1. Historical review 
As the Second World War also took its tolls on Greece, it was a substantially weakened Greece that 
faced the end of it. However, immediately following the War, a civil war erupted with one side 
supported by Western powers and capitalistic ideology, and one side supported by Eastern powers 
and communist ideology. This drew up the lines between Western and Eastern supporters, with a 
considerable support to the Communist parties due to the poverty during and caused by the War 
(Manolopoulos 2011: 1ff). The internal struggle between left and right was followed by a military 
coup in 1967, which was prompted by fears among the conservatives that Communists could wield 
influence via elections (Ibid.). The junta was, like the dictatorship in Argentina, a very suppressive 
right-wing dictatorship led by military colonels. However, interestingly the harsh measures and 
deeply conservative trends within the junta led to increased support of the Communist ideology and 
a strong and initiating path dependent commitment to an entitlement culture and hostility to the 
private sector (Manolopoulos 2011: 70). Additionally, this prolonged element of conflict within 
Greece is part of the reason why George Papandreou
2
 had to buy social peace during his time as 
                                                 
2
 Note the resemblance of name to George Papandreou, prime minister in Greece between 2009-2011.  
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Prime Minister. This buying of social peace following the civil war’s unrest appears to be one of the 
more recent origins of the very pronounced culture of clientilism within Greece and Greek politics.  
 
5.2. Clientilism 
Across literature and media, scholars seem to agree on at least one thing; that Greece has a very 
pronounced system of clientilism, which is one of the causes of the current problems in Greece and 
Europe. According to Manolopoulos (2011), the very ingrained system of nepotism and clientilism 
in Greece originates in part from the early adoption of universal voting rights which, combined with 
an unreformed clan-based system, led to a lack of a reformation of the class system and thereby a 
lack of a growing middleclass, as was seen in Northern Europe. Additionally, this meant that a very 
cosy system of relations between the Greek local governments and the wealthy citizens was 
developed. This is what developed what has been called the “Hellenic Peronism”, or elaborated 
clientilism (Manolopoulos, 2011: 66), accentuating the similarities to the Argentinean case. But 
contrary to Argentina, the Greek clientilism was supported by multiple sources, as support was 
constantly sought to rule out the opponents. During the post-War years, the right-wing proponents 
bought trade unions and other significant actors through favours, in order to gain leverage over the 
communist side and eventually crush their resistance (Manolopoulos 2011: 67). This conflict 
between left and right and the buying of support, shows that there has always been a battle of 
favours within the Greek system.  
Thus, the populist path of buying the support of the trade unions, emanating in the post-War years, 
was followed almost entirely by all governments from 1981 onwards (Manolopoulos 2011: 79; 
Polychroniou 2011: 6). George Papandreou’s attempts to buy social peace meant that favours were 
awarded to trade unions and other interest groups in return of political support, and this started 
nepotism around political posts, and according to Manolopoulos (2011) the 1980s saw the birth of a 
ruinously wasteful and corrupt public sector (p. 8). Greece further became a member of the EU in 
1981. 
This close link between politicians and the elite meant that the middleclass - seen in northern 
Europe, and who undertakes checks and balances on politicians - was not present in Greece in the 
post-War years. This in turn makes clientilism even more well-developed and pronounced. The 
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asymmetries that have risen in this form of structure, inherently promote these same asymmetries 
too, and thereby create a cyclical pattern, or a path dependent pattern, of asymmetries. This is 
bound up on Greece’s industries. According to Stratfor Global Intelligence3 (2010 in Manolopoulos 
2011: 76), power has been concentrated within a few wealthy families, as they could afford to make 
infrastructural improvements and thus also choose the infrastructural landscape and priorities. This 
in turn also gives those with “infrastructural power” power over the workforce; where and with 
what can they work, and over import of both industries and capital (Ibid.).  
Additionally, the elite is capable of framing issues as they prefer, as they often also own media 
stations and other institutions responsible of communicating to the public (Polychroniou 2011: 6).  
The power centre further underlines the impunity of the ruling class. And, under Greek law it is also 
both illegal to prosecute or arrest any politician without the approval of the parliament, as well as 
being legal to give “gratitude gifts” – a sophisticated way of legalising corruption.4 Impunity of the 
ruling class further makes it difficult to reform, liberalise or introduce meritocracy – as opposed to 
nepotism - as this is not in the interest of those in power (Manolopoulos 2011: 10, 82). 
Thus, it is a structural problem within Greece that the administration is so extensively centralised 
and based upon clientilism.   
 
5.3. Tax avoidance 
In a centralised state that is built on clientilism, it is harder to gain the trust and interest from the 
public. This is due to the distance that politicians create between the decisions and the public, 
generating a feeling of not being in a participatory democracy. This in turn, makes paying taxes to 
the state less about sustaining a state that controls the oligarchs and protects the ‘common man’ as 
is experienced in Northern Europe. Creating a non-tax-paying society, where the money are instead 
                                                 
3
 Stratfor Global Intelligende is a subscription-based provider of geopolitical analysis. It is a private, but independent, 
newsoutlet undertaking analysis and evaluations of currents event through a geopolitically oriented lens. It aims to be 
objective and without ideology, agenda or national bias. For further information see http://www.stratfor.com/about-us 
4
 ”Gratitude gifts” means that, although it is illegal to bribe anyone, it is legal to give a present after the action is done. 
I.e. if a person wants to influence a certain decision, he cannot bribe someone to vote in favour, but he can give a 
present after the vote has been cast. Making an agreement previous to the vote, of a gratitude gift, thus is a way of 
bribing or buying favours (Manolopoulos 2011: 82)  
34 
 
spent on bribes is a natural development (Manolopoulos 2011: 65f). Particularly in Greece where 
“spending money on public sector investment[s] of dubious value, total absence of accountability, 
and sheer administrative incompetence are all hallmarks of the way the Greek state operates” 
(Polychroniou 2011: 11). This manifests itself, inter alia, through tax collection, where the Greek 
government collects 7.9% of GDP from direct taxes, in comparison with the EU average on 13.7% 
(Polychroniou 2011: 8), making the state budget smaller yet. Tax evasion, according to 
Polychroniou (2011), is so widespread in Greece that it covers virtually every sector and aspect of 
society (p. 11), and it is a vital dimension of the Greek saga and an endemic part of the current 
situation in Greece (Featherstone 2011: 196; Manolopoulos 2011: 108).  
 
5.4. Entering the Eurozone 
When Greece joined the EU and adopted the euro in 2001, the Greek elite saw it as “easy access to 
additional wealth” (Polychroniou 2011: 7). Among other things the entry created a sudden access 
to structural programme funding and cheap borrowing, which gave rise to the new middle class in 
Greece (Nechio, 2010: 1; Manolopoulos 2011: 78). Within a few years, Greece obtained the highest 
owner-occupancy rate in all of Europe, and people spent borrowed money buying homes, second 
homes, holiday homes and big cars. The prosperous times during the first years of the Eurozone 
gave a false feeling of comfort and prosperity, where reforms of the industries and a 
decentralisation of the administration could have been undertaken by the Greek government. 
Although clientilistic tendencies are still prevalent, Greece has to some extent undergone a 
liberalisations (Featherstone 1998: 33), which is highly due to the European demands. However, 
Greece remains structurally reliant on its main income generating sectors; tourism, shipping and 
agriculture (Tsinisizelis 2002: 154), and has not reformed enough or created capacity for future 
earnings to sustainably change this. Greece is therefore caught between the highly industrialised 
countries in the West and countries with cheap labour in East Manolopoulos 2011: 16). This is 
further elaborated in the analysis.  
The Argentine example (see page 4, page 21) has many parallels with the current experience of 
Greece, which is characterised by high levels of debt, a stagnant economy and utilisation of the euro 
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as the equivalent of a hard currency peg. Moreover, Greece, like Argentina, is carrying out an IMF 
programme with a focus on fiscal adjustment and reform (Nechio, 2010: 1). 
So, although entering the EU in 1981 was seen as “the end of the nightmares of the mid-twentieth 
century, a symbol of maturation of democracy” (Manolopoulos 2011: 77), Manolopoulos (2011) 
and Tsinisizeli (2002) maintain that Greece remains highly dysfunctional and has been shielded by 
the euro, which has lead to the lack of reforms and kept Greece on an overspending mode, reliant 
on the Common Agricultural Programme (CAP) and oblivious to the costs of entering the Eurozone 
(p. 16 and p. 154; Polychroniou 2011: 4). 
Summing up, clientilism remains a substantial problem within the Greek administration, a problem 
that infiltrates most of the country and structures influencing the Eurozone crisis. Although the 
introduction of the euro were seen as a new beginning, able to open up new horizons and 
possibilities for Greece (Polychroniou 2011: 4), reforms have not been undertaken, and Greece 
remains reliant on financial aid from the core of the EU, and now the Troika, as well as on 
industries that do not generate much value-added income to the country (Featherstone 1998: 33).  
In the following an introduction to the EU is conducted, followed by an empirical section on the 
EMU including the Maastricht convergence criteria.  
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6. Introduction to the European Union 
The following chapter presents some of the estimated core elements, of relevance to this project, of 
the EU. First, the EU’s origin is very briefly stated, introducing the asymmetrical pattern which was 
laid out at the creation of the EU. This leads to a section introducing the Maastricht Treaty, the 
main elements of interest in it, and who the main decision makers were. Subsequently the same is 
presented regarding the Stability and Growth Pact. The fourth section presents the changes made as 
the Eurozone crisis escalated, the Troika and the different stabilisation packages are included in this 
section. Finally, the chapter is concluded and summed up. 
The EU came about as an attempt to unite the European countries economically and politically in 
order to ensure lasting peace (Polychroniou 2011: 1). It was in the face of World War 2, which had 
left the countries in pieces and with an immanent fear of ever again seeing one country with 
excessive power on the rise. The collaboration was initially manifested as a Coal and Steel Union in 
1950, and was between the BeNeLux countries
5
: France, Italy and West Germany (europa.eu; 
Afxentiou 2000: 246). What is remarkable is that the countries relatively immediate after the 
Second World War came together in a political collaboration in an attempt to avoid future wars 
despite their conflicting affiliations during the War. The initial Union was already expanded in 1957 
by the same six countries with the Treaty of Rome, which created the initial framework for the 
‘Common Market,’ under the aim of creating a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard 
of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it (ec.europa.eu 1957 A). As this 
initial framework was developed and agreed upon by these six countries, they were understood to 
define the core of the EU. The decisions they made at the time regarding the framework started a 
path dependent process, and are understood to be defining for the framework as it looks today. 
Although the EU has gone from including six members to currently including 27; and although 
there has been substantial developments within the Union, the initial framework by the initial six 
countries is still understood to have provided certain understandings, possibilities and priorities, and 
guided future developments in certain directions, which are currently affecting Greece. 
Creating a common market naturally led to thoughts on establishing a common currency with fixed 
exchange rates. The Treaty of Rome transformed the existing union into the European Economic 
                                                 
5
 Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
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Community, which included the initial steps towards what much later became the ECB
6
. In 1964 a 
Committee of Governors, from the member states’ central banks, was created to manage the 
framework for economic cooperation. Eventually they proved monumental for the move to the 
EMU (Scheller 2006: 17f). The EMU has been an integral part of the European project since the 
1970s, where the common market-idea developed and eventually led to The Maastricht Treaty 
(1991), which created the independent ECB. Although several attempts of financial integration or 
alignment of member states’ fiscal policies were undertaken between 1957 and 1991, these are 
omitted from the project, as they ultimately failed individually and collectively lead to the EMU as 
we know it (Mongelli 2008). 
Just prior to the inclusion of Greece into EU in 1981, the European Monetary System (EMS) was 
created, whose principal aim was to align exchange rates within an agreed margin of ±2.25% of a 
weighted average of participating currencies (Mongelli 2008: 11).
7
 Remaining within this fixed 
margin and undertaking what could be termed modernising measures, defined as changing the 
state’s role in the domestic economy and of lessening the state’s domination of civil society 
(Featherstone 1998: 23) are seen as demands that Greece had to respect in order to be a full member 
of the EU. These demands were expanded and clarified with the convergence criteria introduced 
with the Maastricht Treaty. 
The following section presents the Maastricht Treaty, which among other things furthered the idea 
of a common market and expanded its integration, and its main components with relevance for this 
project. 
 
6.1. The Economic Monetary Union 
In the following chapter the three stages of the EMU will be scrutinized on the bases of the 
historical development that EU has gone through. Firstly the Maastricht Treaty is introduced and 
the convergence criteria described, secondly the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is presented. 
                                                 
6
 The ECB was not founded before the Treaty of Amsterdam from 1998, and did not exercise its full power and purpose 
until the introduction of the euro. But the idea started flourishing in the 1960s and has since then developed to become 
what we know as the ECB today. 
7
 Officially no currency was expressed to be the dominant economy to be followed, however, according to Mongelli 
(2008) Germany was the dominant economy, followed by all other participating economies (p. 11). 
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6.1.1. Maastricht  
In February 1992 The Maastricht Treaty was signed, but it did not enter into force before November 
1993. This treaty established the European Union and changed the founding treaties of the earlier 
European Communities (Scheller 2006: 21). 
The Maastricht Treaty was the result of both external and internal events. Internally, the Member 
states
8
 wished to supplement the progress achieved by the Single European Act with new reforms. 
The Maastricht Treaty was the result of the monetary changes, but it was also agreed upon as a 
symbol of transition from being a community to being a union (Scheller 2006: 21). In relation to the 
Greek crisis the important objectives of the Maastricht Treaty were to strengthen the democratic 
legitimacy of the institutions, to improve the effectiveness of the institutions and to establish 
economic and monetary union... (Ibid.).  
With the Maastricht Treaty the EMU did the finishing touch on the Single Market, and formed 
economic policies consisting of three components: “1.The member states must ensure coordination 
of their economic policies, 2. provide for multilateral surveillance of this coordination, 3. and are 
subject to financial and budgetary discipline.” (europa.eu 2012A). The objectives of the EMU were 
to create a single currency and to ensure stability of this currency accomplished with “price 
stability and respect for the market economy” (Ibid.).  
The Maastricht Treaty’s main amendment to the European Economic Community (EEC) was the 
foundations of the EMU and the method and timetable for its realization were laid out through three 
stages (Scheller 2006: 21). The EMU has its origin in the European Council meeting in 1988, which 
established a committee
9
 to prepare a report about how an economic and monetary union with a 
common currency could be introduced (euo.dk 2010A). Dominating members in the committee 
were President Delors and the Bundesbank President Karl-Otto Pöhl; and this committee, called the 
Delors Committee, was this way not without hierarchy (Verdun 1997: 17ff). Here power relations 
are interesting to analyze, -this will be done in the following chapter. The members were selected 
by the European Council and they all believed that: One: the inflation was damaging to growth. 
                                                 
8
 At that time: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom (http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm) 
9
 including the European Commission President, Jacques Delors, 12 central bank Presidents and three independent 
experts. 
39 
 
Two: stable exchange rates were necessary to ensure the proper operation of the Internal Market. 
Three: the dominance of the D-Mark as the anchor currency, and hence the dominance of the 
Bundesbank in the determining European monetary policies was political unsatisfactory. Four: even 
though the Committee favored the new European monetary institution, it was seen as unwanted that 
an economic authority would be established at the supranational level. Instead the Delors 
Committee wanted national governments to stay responsible for national macroeconomic and fiscal 
policies (Verdun 1997: 17ff).  
Thus, the governments in favour of the EMU would benefit from a report carried out by the Delors 
Committee - the three stages plan for the EMU. The EMU can be seen as an advantage for the 
member states since the participating countries this way could hinder conflicts over currencies, 
which had been the case between Germany and France earlier (Moravcsik 1998: 380). These 
conflicts had before the EMU been destructive for the larger economies and the prices on imported 
goods had increased in France, simultaneously with Germany loosing its competitiveness, which 
was a result of the French devaluation. Additionally the fact that the member state governments 
expected that the German monetary regime could become the core of European monetary policies, 
implied that they also knew that if a ECB was to be set up, it would probably be a model of the 
Bundesbank. Governments who had pegged their currencies to the D-Mark were more reserved to 
the idea of an EMU-model on the Bundesbank (Ibid.). Furthermore the absence of a European 
agreement on the EMU-project would for these governments indicate that several countries could 
go ahead and implement a single currency zone outside the framework of ECB. This way it was 
better for all to have a say in the setting up of the scheme. For this reason these countries were 
willing to make compromises to their original position in proportion to the EMU (Verdun 1997: 
17ff).  
On a meeting in 1989 the European Council adopted the suggestions that the Delors Report had 
made, and decided that the first phase of the EMU would start in 1990 (euo.dk 2010A). The three 
stages were as follows:  
First stage should begin January 1990. Here a closer coordination of economic policies and closer 
cooperation among central banks had to be implemented. Countries should mutually monitor each 
other’s economies to ensure a more uniform development (europa.eu 2012A and euo.dk 2010A). 
Second stage should begin January 1994. The purpose was to ensure stability of prices and sound 
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public finances. The aim was also to get a more stable and uniform development of the EU. To 
achieve this, the countries should strive to abide certain financial requirements called the 
convergence criteria in order to participate in the third stage of the EMU (these are explained in the 
next section). It was decided that the new currency, the euro, would be introduced in 2002. It was 
furthermore decided that the third phase of the EMU could start in 1999 in 11 countries (europa.eu 
2012A and euo.dk 2010A).   
Third stage should begin January 1999 and was the physical creation of the euro (europa.eu 2012A 
and euo.dk 2010A).   
In the following the third stage of the EMU is introduced with the inclusion of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. To summarise the creation of the EMU, it can be accredited to interests deeply 
anchored within a select few member states; the primary states being France and Germany. 
 
6.1.2. Stability and Growth pact as the third stage of the EMU 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is part of the third stage of the EMU. This section firstly 
introduces the important parts of the third stage of the EMU that are considered essential for our 
project, and followed by a closer look at the SGP. 
The third stage featured more than the creation of the euro. Each member state also should meet 
certain criteria, and member states could only participate in the Eurozone if they met these criteria 
(europa.eu 2012 A; euo.dk 2010 A). ECB was developed and responsible for the euro, sets key 
short-term interest rates and monitors the money supply (Scheller 2006: 21). 
The countries’ common monetary and exchange rate policies were supplemented by that the fact 
that the member states were obliged to coordinate the economic policies as a matter of common 
interest (europa.eu 2012 A and euo.dk 2010 A). Greece was not accepted in the Eurozone before 1
st
 
January 2001, because they did not meet the convergence criteria (euo.dk 2010 A). 
In order for member states to be allowed to join the EMU these convergence criteria have to be met 
(eurotreaties.com 1992). These criteria are popularly described as price stability, exchange rates, 
long-term interest rates and government finances (europa.eu 2006 A). The Maastricht convergence 
criteria thus require from each member state: 
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1. ”The achievement of a high degree of price stability; this will be apparent from a rate of 
inflation which is close to that of, at most, the three best-performing Member States in terms of 
price stability” (eurotreaties.com 1992). In practice, the inflation rate of a given Member State 
must not exceed by more than 1.5% points that of the three best-performing Member States in 
terms of price stability observed over a period of one year before the examination of the situation 
in the specific member state (Lipinska 2008). 
2. “The observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing against 
the currency of any other Member State” (eurotreaties.com 1992).  
3. “…the durability of convergence achieved by the Member State” which in the member states 
should be “reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels” furthermore the member state has to 
have “an average nominal long-term interest rate that does not exceed by more than two 
percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price 
stability” (eurotreaties.com 1992). 
4.  “The sustainability of the government financial position … will be apparent from having 
achieved a government budgetary position without a deficit  that is excessive …” 
(eurotreaties.com 1992). Meaning that when the Commission draw up its annual 
recommendation to the Council of Finance Ministers, they have to examine observance with 
budgetary discipline on the basis of the following two criteria: 
a) “The ratio of the annual government deficit to GDP must not exceed 3% at the end of 
the preceding financial year”.  
b) “The ratio of gross government debt to GDP must not exceed 60% at the end of the 
preceding financial year” (eurotreaties.com 1992 and europa.eu 2006 B).  
The fourth criterion is part of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).  
In the 1990’s the EU found that the Maastricht convergence criteria were not sufficient to guarantee 
a smooth transition to the euro. Consequently the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 included a political 
pact tied to the convergence criteria (Exenberg 2004: 2ff), which included supervision every two 
years in a report to the Council on the progress the country has made; these are the convergence 
reports (europa.eu 2006 B). 
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The SPG plays a large role for each member state. It was the German Finance Minister, Theo 
Waigel, who suggested the SPG, and it was implemented by the member states of the Eurozone in 
1999. The SPG can be regarded as a framework of coordination of national fiscal policies in the 
EMU (eu4journalists.eu 2011 A), and the SPG must enforce common criteria, which member 
states are obliged to comply with in order to reduce the risk of inflation, as described above 
(Lapavitsas et al. 2010: 345f). In cases where the criteria are not obeyed, a member state will be 
met with financial sanctions (euo.dk D). Initially, the penalty is a non-interest-bearing deposit 
within the European Community, but it could be changed into a fine if the excessive deficit is not 
corrected with two years (europa.eu 2012 A).  
The purpose with the pact was in a preventive and corrective way, to facilitate and maintain the 
stability, and fiscal discipline in the EMU. In addition the aim was to ensure that member states 
maintain their budgetary discipline efforts after the introduction of the euro, and in general that 
public finances were kept healthy (euo.dk 2010 B). In a broader perspective the aim with the SPG 
was to make the euro competitive against the dollar (Lapavitsas et al. 2010: 345f). Besides the 
preventive part there is a corrective set of rules; a procedure that is introduced if a member state has 
a disproportionately huge deficit (euo.dk 2010 C) 
However in the run up to the SPG several countries were sceptic. Particularly Germany, whose 
Deutchemark was both stable and powerful, was concerned that other member states would not be 
capable of complying with the tough regulations in economic policy that were necessary to get an 
efficient euro. However, France as well as Germany experienced an excessive deficit in 2003. As a 
result the EC and the European Council decided to adjust and revise the SPG. The revision meant 
more flexibility on the excessive deficit and fiscal policy (eu4journalists.eu 2011 A).     
 
6.2. The Eurozone Crisis 
The crisis of the Eurozone broke out as a result of the global financial crisis and the crack of the 
Lehman Brothers in 2008 (Kindleberger 2011: 24 et al.; Polychroniou 2011: 1). During the first 
stage of the crisis there were threats of a financial meltdown, and governments across Europe did 
not hesitate to bail out weak banks with several rescue packages (Ibid.). In the continuation of the 
bank crises in both Iceland and Ireland, a wave of debt crises emerged, - particularly in Greece, who 
43 
 
was facing an enormous debt and a risk of a default (Ibid.). As a consequence of the massive debt in 
Greece, the Troika suggested a huge rescue plan on 110 billion euros, which was approved in May 
2010 (Polychroniou 2011: 2). This bailout package from the Troika included a structural adjustment 
programme containing strict austerity measures, these were essentially decided on by the EU 
authorities, and were not so much to be understood as suggestions as there were to be understood as 
ultimate demands (Ibid.). The measures consisted of new consumption taxes, or the so-called value 
added taxes. Following the agreement on these austerity measures, the Greek trade unions called a 
general strike in protest (News.bbc.co.uk 2012). With a history of an inefficient public sector and a 
large degree of corruption, Greece has from a Eurozone perspective been regarded as the weakest 
link of the Eurozone. Although Greece is only accountable for around 2 % of the total GDP of the 
Eurozone GDP, the Greek crisis has quickly spread across the Eurozone especially to the Southern 
periphery countries Portugal and Spain (Polychroniou 2011: 2).   
After the bailout package from the Troika was approved, markets reacted negatively, as it was 
believed that the package would make the Greek debt even more unsustainable for the Greek 
government (News.bbc.co.uk 2012). For instance was the Greece credit rating downgraded (Ibid.), 
which had a so-called spill-over effect as it resulted in a systematic Eurozone crisis (Polychroniou 
2011:2).  The Troika was, and is, essentially controlling the Greek economic/fiscal policies with 
strict austerity measures, while the debt keeps, and kept, on rising. In 2011 authorities from the 
Troika appealed to the Greek government, to implement reforms immediately in order to stabilize 
the finances as quickly as possible (News.bbc.co.uk 2012), as this was needed to stabilize the Greek 
as well as European market. Additionally countries like Spain, Portugal, France, England and Italy 
are no exception when it comes to budget cuts (Polychroniou 2011:3).  A second intervention 
package of 109 billion euro was agreed by European leaders in July 2011. Subsequently the market 
continuously reacted negatively to the bailouts, because of a fear of a Greek default 
(News.bbc.co.uk 2012). The bailouts were considered so unsustainable that Greece would never be 
able to pay off their debts, which is what creates insecurity in the markets. Thus the major credit 
rating agencies cut Greece's rating to a degree that indicates a real risk of a default. In the autumn 
2011 the Eurozone offered Greece a 50 percent debt write off as an exchange for increased financial 
restrictions. Meanwhile the Prime Minister of Greece, George Papandreou from the leftwing party 
PASOK, hesitated to accept the offer, and planned a referendum; this, however, was never 
accomplished. As the Greek crisis carried on, a third bailout was provided by the Troika on nothing 
less than 130 billion euro (News.bbc.co.uk 2012).  
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Total debt (private and public) of Greece was in 2012 703 billion euros, or 296% of Greek GDP, 
and total debt has increased between two and three times in the course of EMU (Lapavitsas et al. 
2010: 2). Greece has a ratio of external to domestic debt on 51:49, and the proportion of external 
debt has also risen significantly in the course of EMU. The Greek public debt is mainly external 
because European financial markets have overestimated the creditworthiness of the Greek states. 
Kindleberger (2012) regards the Greek crisis and the debt of the government as a credit crisis, as it 
impeded the ability of the Greek government to reduce its fiscal deficit (pp. 275). 
The pressure on labour has intensified the disparities of competitiveness among Eurozone members; 
this has furthered the split of the Eurozone into core and periphery, with Greece being one out of 3 
of the periphery countries (Spain, Portugal), and with Germany as the prime core-country 
(Featherstone 2011: 198). 
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ANALYSIS I 
 
7. The effect of the Maastricht convergence criteria on Greece  
To answer the research question on how Greece has been influenced by the Eurozone, it is 
necessary to gain an understanding of how the convergence criteria have posed restrictions on 
Greece, and how path dependent power asymmetries are expressed through the enacted 
convergence criteria from the Maastricht Treaty.  
This is done by analyzing the four convergence criteria, which will give an understanding of how 
Greece has been influenced by these criteria. Firstly the effects of EU’s price stability as a measure 
of inflation is analyzed, followed by an analysis of how EU’s “close-to-fixed” exchange rates and 
interest rates have influenced Greece and lastly the fourth criteria of low government deficit and 
debt is analyzed. Throughout this part of the analysis Greece’s competitiveness, as a periphery 
country, towards the core countries is held in mind. It is thus analyzed if the convergence criteria 
are more favourable for core- or periphery-countries. From a historical path dependent perspective 
it is argued that the establishment of the Eurozone has historical roots which have shaped the 
institutional structure and its power relations, which are now influencing Greece. In the end of the 
chapter is a final chapter, which investigates the relation between debt, growth and wage increases. 
This will help understand the historical path between core and periphery countries.  
This will lead us to the next chapter where the differences and similarities between Argentina and 
Greece are discussed, which will enable us to answer our last research question on why Greece is 
acting differently to what Argentina did under their financial crisis.  
The following section initially analyses the importance of the Maastricht convergence criteria to 
Greece, and secondly theorises on the convergence criteria as a critical juncture. Here the historical 
institutionalism is consistently used as framework throughout the analysis.  
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7.1. The enacting of The Maastricht Treaty and the convergence criteria as a 
critical juncture 
Although there have been many critical junctures in the European history, or many moments in time 
that could be defined as critical junctures the focus in this chapter is on the convergence criteria 
signed with the Maastricht Treaty, which have had and have large impact on the economic crisis 
Greece are facing currently. The adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, and thereby the convergence 
criteria, is seen as a critical juncture as these criteria are crucial for each member state in its room 
for manoeuvre in the EMU. Thus, the approval of the convergence criteria offered an option of 
choosing. Countries could either choose to ratify the convergence criteria fully, only ratify some of 
the phases or none at all, which essentially would mean a complete exit from the EU. Hence, a 
window of opportunity was opened where usual rules were somewhat relaxed in order for countries 
to decide their future path.   
The reasons why the convergence criteria are interesting as a critical juncture, is firstly because it is 
expected that the financial policies undertaken domestically in Greece lead back to the 
commitments made at the ratification of the Maastricht convergence criteria. Namely, that the 
convergence criteria continuously sets boundaries for countries’ fiscal and monetary behaviour. 
Secondly, the convergence criteria are interesting because these elements of the Treaty are expected 
to be signs of a very manifested and ingrained path dependent power relationship in the EU. 
According to Moravscik (1998) the creation of the EMU and the stronger monetary and economic 
integration between the EU Member states was to a large extent reflected by German and French 
interests (p. 380). This indicates that the core countries have gained certain advantages by having 
established themselves as core in the initial European framework, contrary to periphery countries 
that, just by merit of having been included in the EU at a later stage, are merely periphery and can 
only adjust existing decision and not introduce a completely new framework. 
Additionally the convergence criteria made under the Maastricht Treaty are interesting as they 
disclose some path dependent power asymmetries that are continued. As mentioned earlier was the 
most influential actors in The Delors Committee French and German; as was the intention at the 
creation of the Coal and Steel Union in 1952. This power relation, with Germany and France as the 
heavyweight powers is carried on, if nothing else, then by merit of the blue print to the convergence 
criteria being written by the Delors Committee dominated by France and Germany. Thus, according 
to a historical institutionalist approach the asymmetrical power relationship within the EU is carried 
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on and manifested through a path dependent pattern of asymmetry. Now follows the analysis of the 
four Maastricht convergence criteria, starting with price stability. 
7.2. Effects of Price stability as a means to control inflation 
The first point of the convergence criteria in the Maastricht Treaty involves price stability. The 
Delors Committee, who drafted the blue print for the Treaty, believed that inflation was detrimental 
to growth (Verdun 1997: 18). If inflation rises disproportionately or excessively it becomes 
expensive to borrow and buy commodities, inter alia, this is because when inflation rises the 
interest rate rises leading to a decrease in the purchasing power parity (PPP) (ecb.europa.eu 2011: 
24), i.e. that a bundle of goods becomes relatively more expensive to buy. This in turn also signifies 
that high inflation equals a decrease in a currency’s value, and thereby an increase in the exchange 
rate. All this together affects a country’s competitiveness; and with large fluctuations in these 
elements the market becomes unstable and insecure, which in turn leads to less investments and 
possibly rising unemployment (ecb.europa.eu 2011: 28). Thus, there is an interest within the EU to 
create price stability in order to create security for investors, equal PPP and equal competitiveness 
to the external world, as these are necessary elements if the euro should work as an anti-pole to the 
dollar. The purpose and the idea of the euro has from the beginning been to create a hard currency, 
which could also compete with the US dollar on the world market, and thereby strengthen the 
European trade both internally and on the world market (Lapavitsas et al. 2010: 341). Greece and 
other peripheral countries have joined the euro at high exchange rates, as mainly Germany dictated 
this policy and thereby ensured low inflation. Had the interest rate been high across the countries in 
the Eurozone, the euro would be unable to compete with the dollar (Ibid.). As mentioned earlier, the 
power within the Delors Committee was mainly placed with the core countries, and the criteria in 
the Treaty are thus portraying as path dependent relation. This comes about firstly because the core 
countries were those that established the Union in its first form in 1952 (See page 32) and at that 
time created boundaries for what future frameworks could look like. Secondly it is likely that these 
countries maintain the same basic power interests as they did in 1957, when the Treaty of Rome 
was ratified, and will in this way be likely to continue down the same path. In this context, it is 
further important to remember that countries were still primarily considered as national, sovereign 
entities and thus representing sovereign interests rather than a united interest, which to some extent 
is still the case in an indirect way through the relationship between the core and periphery countries. 
Thus price stability represents the core countries as they are not severely affected by this. If a 
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periphery country was to devalue their currency, this would lead to a loss in competitiveness in the 
core as opposed to the devaluing country. The devaluing country would gain competitiveness as an 
effect of their devaluation. This is also the case, if the devaluation happened in a core country. But 
as inflation is generally lower in, for instance Germany, than it is in Greece (tradingeconomics.com) 
the interest in devaluating is supposedly higher in Greece. Therefore, the core, whose prices were 
close to what was determined to be the fixed prices at stability, had an interest in creating this 
demand, such that the periphery countries would not devalue or use other monetary mechanisms in 
order to gain competitiveness. Therefore a promise to fix prices within the agreed upon price 
stability framework, was problematic in Greece due to several reasons. Firstly, wages in Greece 
were not sufficiently high for the Greeks to be able to buy goods at the fixed prices according to the 
three best performing countries in the EU. The way the Greeks achieved to buy was by increasing 
labour cost, i.e. increasing wages and through borrowing from the core countries, both privately and 
in the public sector (Lapavitsa et al. 2010: 42). Secondly, this turned into an increased problem as 
austerity measures were introduced in Greece from 2010 and onwards, because part of the 
demanded austerity measures were to cut public wages, which made it even more difficult for the 
Greeks to buy goods, which again led to reduced growth and hence more money had to be 
borrowed to pay off dept end interests. According to Polychroniou (2011) prices have been kept up 
at the European level throughout the current sovereign crisis. As a result, the demand for price 
stability has affected Greece negatively because they had to borrow money from the core in order to 
buy at a high “euro-price”. Particularly after the austerity measures demanded by the Troika has the 
first convergence criteria posed a large challenge, and resulted in Greek citizens struggle to 
purchase. Polychroniou (2011) continues by pointing out that the euro has led to: 1) greater 
economic and social inequality among the various national economies, 2) has exacerbated the 
problem of unemployment in the peripheral economies - despite how price stability is meant to 
increase investments and lead to less unemployment -, and 3. has produced huge transfers from the 
periphery to the core (p. 5). For instance has Germany been lending money to Greece and thereby 
created demand for German goods, thus exporting credit dependence, in terms of loans and later 
intervention packages, and thereby increased debt in Greece (Featherstone 2011: 200). 
Polychroniou (2011) continues by stating that “...to have expected the political and financial elite in 
Greece to engage in such reflections and ponder whether it was wise for the country to enter the 
euro when it did would be equivalent to expecting a shark to twist and turn away at the smell of 
blood” (p. 5). The easy access to capital, both in form of Common Agricultural Policies and 
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borrowing (Mundell 1997: 216), was a huge carrot for the fairly new Greek re-entry of democracy, 
and thus did the EU funding balance out the dangers of becoming a part of the Eurozone.  
Exenberg (2004) also points out that the crucial problem of different inflation among the monetary 
unions, is that prices differ regionally which is corrected either by changes in the exchange rate or 
by movements of the cheaper goods, which leads to workers becoming unemployed in the high-
price-economy. If the free flow of work does not exist and the exchange rate cannot be changed, 
then inflation differentials is a serious problem leading to unemployment (Exenberg 2004: 6). In the 
next chapter the issue of exchange rate measurement is analysed. 
 
7.2. Exchange rates as part of the convergence criteria 
The following section will identify to what extent exchange rate as an economic instrument and as 
an integral element in the convergence criteria has influenced Greek economy. 
As it was emphasised previously in this report member states are obliged to participate in the 
exchange rate mechanism of the EMU for at least two years and must refrain from devaluing its 
currency, as a condition of achieving membership in the Euro.  
As mentioned above are the Maastricht convergence criteria one of the critical junctures in the 
relationship between Greece and the Eurozone, and particularly is the second convergence criteria 
about devaluating a country’s currency critical, - especially to a country in financial crisis, like the 
one Greece is in at the moment. The exchange rate is a part of the convergence criteria that are a 
prerequisite for becoming a member of the Eurozone, and is thus also a substantial element in the 
whole EMU-project. Greece joined the Euro at high exchange rates and a lack of competitiveness 
from the beginning (Lapavitsas et al. 2010: 341), and simultaneously Greece experienced rising 
capital imports from the core. The country has been outmatched by core countries as Germany, 
inter alia, due to high exchange rates - when entering the Eurozone - which have affected Greek 
exports negatively. The fact that this convergence criterion excludes the possibility for Greece to 
devalue currency is a major problem being in a financial crisis. As Greece is currently experiencing 
a lack of competitiveness, a devaluation could be an appropriate possibility, as a devaluation would 
lead to Greek products being relatively cheaper and thereby leading to an increased export, and 
50 
 
decreasing import, as domestically produced products would also be cheaper. As a result Greece 
could have increased its competitiveness in relation to the core countries (Schlecht 2011)
10
. 
Although regarded from a path dependent perspective, the core countries of the Eurozone have no 
interest in seeing Greece increasing its relative competitiveness. 
Different internal factors across the Eurozone countries have proven to pose substantial challenges 
since the introduction of a common currency. A broad variety of domestic policy behaviours from 
the size of the welfare state, wage policies and labour market reforms all matter when a single 
currency is made (Dyson 2000:5). Especially when it includes a fixed exchange rate regime, it is 
clear that domestic policy affairs, such as the wage-dumping strategy followed in Germany, will 
have implications for member states’ competitiveness.  
This is not to say that the entry in the Eurozone is the only responsible factor for the huge 
unemployment or lack of competitiveness in Greece as such. However it can be argued from a path 
dependent perspective that the fixed exchange rate brings a distorted relation between unequal 
actors from core and periphery countries.  
Summing up, it can be concluded that Greece is not able to devaluate as long as they are part of the 
Eurozone, since all Eurozone member states would agree on a devaluation. Devaluating a currency 
has historically been used as a monetary policy instrument to overcome a sovereign debt crises, 
since this would make goods in the devaluating country relatively cheaper to import for other 
countries compared to the other countries’ goods. This would increase the foreign demand for 
cheaper goods and thereby increase export for the devaluating country. Greece would thus benefit 
from devaluating its currency, since they would profit from export. A devaluation is contrarily able 
to induce a loss in profit in the buying country which will weaken its competitiveness, which 
afterwards will induce a decrease in export for the devaluating country (Greece). Germany does not 
want other Eurozone countries to devaluate, since this would induce a loss in their competitiveness. 
However it would probably not be a problem for Germany if it was only Greece who devaluated, 
but if other debt-troubled countries like Spain, Portugal and Italy were also devaluating it would 
reduce the competitiveness for Germany. This might also be another sign of path dependency in the 
asymmetric power relations within the Eurozone. 
                                                 
10
 Michael Schlecht is from Die Linkes, which is a fairly new left-wing political party in Germany. 
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7.3. Average nominal long-term interest rate 
In this section the third convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty is analysed, and it is identified 
how this criterion is affecting Greece as a member of the EMU.   
This convergence criteria deals with the fact that ECB uses the long-term nominal interest rate as a 
monetary policy instrument to adjust the interest rate, which locks the Greek monetary policies to 
the line that the ECB and the EC have decided on: This line is determined by the three best 
performing member states, and no country’s interest rate should be above this by more than two 
percentage points (eurotreaties.com 1992).  
One consequence of freezing the nominal interest-rate within two percentage points is that this can 
create inflation in Greece. This is caused by people being inclined to borrow more money, because 
of the low interest rate increasing the following demand for cash, which leads to a necessity to 
increase money supply, which in turn is one of the things that creates inflation (Blanchard and 
Fischer 1989: 364). 
With a “close-to-pegged” nominal interest rate, Greece has no monetary instrument to meet the 
demand for money as they are not allowed to print more money, i.e. the country does not have the 
interest rate instrument to deal with inflation. Greece as a member of the Eurozone has other 
instruments like for example reduction in labour cost which in the long term would avoid inflation. 
In other words, they still have options in terms of fiscal policies. 
For the EU as an institution, locking the interest rate at a low level, is - for the member states ideal 
as a convergence criterion, because in this way they are able to stimulate growth within the 
Eurozone, as this allows people to borrow more money and therefore spend more (Blanchard and 
Fischer 1989: 364). An increased consumption means increased demand, which will have a positive 
effect on unemployment. But for a country like Greece, freezing the interest rate is part of the 
reason for huge Greek loans, which in turn is part of the reason why Greece is now in a sovereign 
debt crisis.  
If Greece was not part of the Eurozone and therefore did not have to obey the criterion, they would 
have been able to increase the nominal interest rate before the crisis started in 2008, and they could 
thereby have stopped the excessive borrowing. It is therefore legitimate to question the EU’s peg at 
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a low nominal interest rate and imposing it on all its member states, since it for Greece might have 
played a large role in the amount of money they have borrowed. An additional element to this is the 
question of whether this criteria is actually inherently good for the EU as a whole, as it is not only 
Greece that currently is suffering from increased debt. Additionally as is currently evident, sharing 
the same currency leads to substantial spill-over effects, such that it is not only Greece that is 
adversely affected by this criteria, but eventually most countries within the EU will have felt some 
consequences of it. From an HI perspective it can be argued that path dependency has a role to play 
here. The three best performing member states, around which the interest rate is pegged, are 
typically among the core countries that also played the largest role in formulating the convergence 
criteria. These have also been the countries performing best in proportion to having a low nominal 
interest rate (Blanchard and Fischer 1989: 364ff). Here it is worth mentioning that the nominal 
interest rate in 2012 for the five best performing member states is as follows: Germany (1.62) 
Luxembourg (1.97), Finland (2.15), Netherlands (2.29) and France (2.99), whereas Greece currently 
has an interest rate on 21.48 (ecb.int 2012). This shows that the core countries are able to keep the 
highest growth now – partly explained through the lowest interest rate - and Greece the lowest 
growth, partly explained through the high interest rate they have due to the financial crisis. 
However, the other three criteria have also had a large an impact on Greek growth, which has 
further been influenced by Germany, as was previously elaborated. Nevertheless it cannot be 
disagreed that EU’s intention of having a low interest rates is desirable, - but it might not be 
possible in a monetary system of states at different economic levels according to Hix (2010: 245). 
This has been touched upon previously and will be further elaborated on in the next section. 
When trying to explain how the historical path dependent power relations have influenced Greece 
through this criterion, it is worth mentioning that core countries with high competitiveness would 
have an interest in keeping the interest rate low since periphery countries (including Greece) then 
would be able to borrow money from them cheaply. In this way the EU countries maintain their 
demand for German goods and Germany continues being a net exporter. Furthermore German 
companies can cheaply borrow money to expand German production and enhance growth in 
Germany. At the moment Germany and other net exporting countries are although also suffering 
from this criteria, since the buyers of German goods are suffering in a debt crises and do not 
demand as much goods as previously (Featherstone 2010: 194 and Grogan 2010:10). 
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7.4. Government debt and deficit  
The last of the convergence criteria concerns the Greek government’s financial position. It is not a 
secret that the ratio of the Greek government deficit to GDP is far above the allowed deficit-GDP 
ratio of 3%. The Greek yearly deficit is currently on € 19,565 billion or 9.1 % of GDP 
(epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 2012). However, it is not only Greece that is struggling with this 
restriction, within the Eurozone area the average government deficit is at 4.1% of GDP (Ibid.), 
which leaves space for improvement across the EU. However, it is worth noting that Germany only 
has a deficit of 1.0 % of GDP. 
When it comes to the ratio of gross government debt to GDP, which, according to the convergence 
criterion, is not supposed to exceed 60%, Greece is not doing well either. They actually have a 
national debt on €355,617 billion or what corresponds to 165.3 % of GDP in 2011. This is further 
expected to rise in 2012 (Schlecht 2010). Contrarily, the average debt to GDP in the remaining 
Eurozone was in 2011 at 87.2% (Ibid.). 
This clearly indicates the bad situation Greece is in at the moment. However, this is not a new status 
for Greece as a member of the Eurozone. When the Eurozone was preparing to initiate the third 
phase of the EMU, Greece did not live up to any of the four criteria according to the Convergence 
Report made by the Commission and the ECB in 1998. Greece therefore had to wait until 2001 to 
enter the third phase of the EMU, and adopt the euro as currency (eur-lex.europa.eu 2001). Between 
1998 and 2001 (when the second Convergence Report was issued) the Greek government deficit 
increased due to liberalised policies and major changes through labour market reforms, the Greek 
government thus had to introduce severe austerity measures. 
According to Polychroniou (2011), the EU, and in particular its demands on Greece, is essentially a 
neoliberal project where states must yield for market mechanisms controlled by the few (p. 2). EU’s 
demands for labour market reforms, liberalisations and privatisations as a way to lower  deficit and 
debt can be questioned as austerity measures taken in Greece has mostly lead to more internal 
inequalities (Christopoulou and Kosma 2011: 7). The effects of the austerity measures have had 
major human complications e.g. high unemployment now 11 years after Greece’s entry in the 
Eurozone. Which can be seen in the development of Greek unemployment; in 1995, before Greece 
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joined the euro, their unemployment was at 9 percent, this has increased to 21.7 percent in 2012 
(Ebc.int 2012; epp.eurostat.ec.europa 2012). 
This fourth convergence criterion has caused problems to many of the European member states, 
also the core countries, as Germany and France. Among other things, both Germany and France 
failed to reduce their budgetary deficit. This meant that they in 2003 both were supposed to move to 
the next step in the sanctioning system after “the early warning” to the excessive deficit procedure, 
and hence both countries should have moved closer to the financial sanctions agreed upon in the 
SGP (Grogan 2011: 23). But Germany and France were not warned by the EMU, and this event 
thus reduces the position of the SGP as well as member states’ confidence in the adherence of the 
criteria. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers failed to apply sanctions against Germany and 
France in 2001-2002 when they were not obeying the fourth criterion on low deficit and debt, - 
which was not the case for Portugal and Greece in respectively 2002 and 2005 (Huafei and Ye 
2011: 10). This reflects the historic asymmetric power relations that were built in the establishment 
of the EMU including the SGP, where Germany and France were the largest investors during the 
development of the SGP. This initial power has thus lead to a lack of sanctionary courage, and the 
EU showed that it was not able to penalize strong countries like Germany and France (Ibid.). This is 
further underlined by and manifested in the Council, where larger countries have a larger number of 
votes, and thereby avoid being punished as they can choose not to approve sanctions against 
themselves (Ibid.).  
Additionally, the fact that EU is built on long-term policies, whereas the domestic policies of the 
member states are often built on short terms policies – due to frequent national elections - has an 
impact on the economic outcome within each member state. In many ways this shows the weakness 
of the penal system and the weakness of the European institutional structure, and is another 
indication of the path dependent process, showing that an institution built on a poor background is 
likely to result in a weak institution in the long term. 
Huafei and Ye (2010) respond to the fact that all EU member states must have anticipated the 
possibility of a financial crisis when they negotiated the rules of the convergence criteria. 
According to them, it sounds perfect with common rules and common punishments, but they point 
to the fact that something is currently going wrong in the EU. Huafei and Ye (2011) try to explain 
the reason why so many countries violate the convergence criteria by the fact that the fines are too 
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low. They argue that the EMU fines on 0.5 percentages of GDP is too low because it is not worth 
obeying the criteria since the member states benefit more by violating the rules (Huafei and Ye 
2010: 10).  
Exenberg (2004) on the other hand blames the institutional construction for not taking care of 
member states that do not obeying the convergence criteria. He explains how the three first criteria 
are mostly important during the accession process to the EMU, i.e. during the convergence from the 
member states original currency to the euro. The fourth criterion is also important during this 
process, but Exenberg accentuates this criterion as having paramount importance for the survival of 
the EMU (p. 4f). Thus with state deficits and debts spinning out of control, the Eurozone will face 
severe challenges, as the institutional framework does not have sufficient remedies to deal with this. 
Where the first three criteria are no longer the responsibility of governments but mainly the 
responsibility of the ECB, i.e. the ECB has the responsibility to ensure adherence to these criteria 
(Ibid.). The responsibility for the fourth criterion still remains the task of the national governments. 
This is something that raises the question of whether the existence of the euro is at all possible, 
while at the same time encompassing countries with different economies and hence different fiscal 
and economic policies they wish to pursue. For this reason, the commitment of the member states’ 
interdependent self-control is not considered by Exenberg to be enough. Because of this, he argues 
that the controlling competences of all three criteria have to stay at the European level and not with 
the individual member states as it is now (p. 4).  
Most probably both the fact that the controlling part of governments deficit and debt is placed 
within the member states and not at the European level; and the fact that the fines might be too 
small are contributing factors in the explanation of why several member states continue to violate 
the criteria of keeping government deficit and debt low.  
Huafei and Ye (2010) argue that the core problem of the Eurozone is because the EMU is facing a 
dilemma. The dilemma is the quite substantial differences that exist among the member states, 
including the different levels of development status and various policy behaviours among the 
member states. They argue that periphery countries like Greece have been included too quickly, and 
that the EU should have waited to enlarge until the country was really qualified and able to adhere 
to the convergence criteria, inter alia. A reason why Greece appeared to adhere to the convergence 
criteria in 2001 is, according to Featherstone (2011), that the American investment bank Goldman 
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Sachs helped the former Conservative Greek government with their budget-numbers, i.e. the bank 
helped fiddle with the numbers so they appeared to live up to the criteria of debt and deficit (p. 
194). This brings to mind whether the European leaders granting Greece entry to the Eurozone 
where blinded by their aspirations to create a European project and a euro that could compete with 
the dollar, and thereby essentially doing themselves and Greece a ‘disservice’ by focusing on 
horizontal rather than vertical integration. 
Among others Hix (2010) tries to explain why monetary unions like the EU fall into problems every 
now and then, as it has been seen and is seen in particularly Greece at the moment. He explains how 
the cycle is a basic law of economics. Times of high economic growth are followed by recession, 
which are then followed by growth, and so on in a cyclical movement. If two states are at different 
stages of the cycle, they are likely to pursue different monetary policies, as was explained in the 
case of the Delors Committee. This means that Greece, in the face of a recession, would prefer to 
cut interest rates to stimulate demand or devalue their currency to make its export sector more 
competitive internationally. On the other side would a government like Germany facing high 
growth, want to increase interest rates in order to dampen pressure on prices and wages, or they 
would revaluate the currency to increase the per-unit value of export and lower the costs of imports. 
In the EU, these options do not exist as convergence criteria have fixed exchange rates and have 
specified common interest rates (Hix 2010: 245), which have played a large role in the way Greece 
has been able to act.  
When it comes to the Greek government debt the amount of money Greece had borrowed in 2010 
was $385 billion, of which it has paid on average a 5% interest-rate, which is a repayment of $19 
billion per year. The Greek GDP was in 2009 $342 billion and government revenues were about 
$115 billion, which means that the Greek government is forced to pay about 20% of their annual 
revenues off on just the interest-rates of their debt per year. The new Troika loan can therefore be 
seen as debt interest-rate, which is again an addition to the Greek debt. A negative debt-interest 
spiral does therefore seem inevitable (Grogan 2010: 21). The reason for these Troika loans appears 
to be proven by the historically asymmetric powers of the EU, as the Greek debt is actually 
financed by German and French banks, which in 2009 held respectively $493 billion and $465 
billion of sovereign debt spread between Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland (Ibid.: 19; Schlecht 
2010), which in turn generate huge revenue in terms of repayment and interest rates to these banks. 
Grogan (2010) is of the belief that a Greek default is only a matter of time. He mainly blames the 
57 
 
core countries (p. 10), as they closed their eyes to the clear violations of convergence criteria when 
Greece entered the Eurozone, particularly referring to the fact that Goldman Sachs had a hand in the 
sudden readiness for Greece to enter the Eurozone (Featherstone 2010: 194; Grogan 2010: 10). 
Additionally Grogan (2010) points out that Germany and France’s breach of the convergence 
criteria have created a generally sloppy approach to the criteria from the other member states which 
has led to an unsustainable national debt in Greece (p. 10ff). Furthermore Lapavitsas et. al (2010) 
point out that around two thirds of German trade is intra-European (pp. 330 and 342ff), which 
indicates that Germany would lose their competitiveness if they were not able to export their 
commodities to among other Greece. This is another sign of asymmetrical power relation within the 
Eurozone, which have been constituted in the establishment of the EMU. 
 
7.5. Competitiveness and historical path dependency  
In this section the relation between debt increases, growth and labour cost increases is explained in 
order to give a clear understanding of how Greek competitiveness has been influenced by all four 
Maastricht convergence criteria.  
During the period of economic growth (also in Greece) in the 00’s, Greece was seduced to borrow 
more than it could pay back, hence the debt kept increasing throughout this period. Part of the 
reason for this is that Greece government have made an expansionary fiscal policy and companies 
have invested largely for borrowed money, which have been further enhanced by a low interest rate 
set by the ECB. The expansion of the economy during a period of growth and debt-increase 
decreases the unemployment rate significantly. This leads to a pressure on the labour market, where 
labour demand increases, while supply decreases. For the labour market to clear in this situation, 
the nominal wage has to increase to equal labour demand and supply. 
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Fig. 1. Graph showing the development of the nominal unit labour costs from year 2000 to 2012 (Lapavitsas et al. 2010: 342). 
This has been the case for nearly all countries in the EU during the 00’s, but to a large degree in 
Greece and other economically troubled countries. The only exception is Germany. Here the 
nominal labour cost has not increased very much, which is due to strict political reforms on the 
labour market in Germany. The differences in the nominal labour cost is one of the reasons that 
Germany, and to some extend France, is more competitive and hence economically better off than 
the other countries, especially Greece (Cf. figure 1). This further means that Germany produces and 
Greece does not, which again means an increase in import and a decrease in export for Greece - 
leading to a government deficit. For this reason, especially Germany is keen on Greek austerity 
packages, so that they can pay back their loans to Germany.  
At the same time, Germany faced severe labour market reforms that squeezed the German 
workforce and kept wages and thus prices low, and in this way Germany managed to hike up its 
exports at the expense of Greece (Information.dk 2010; Lapavitsas et al. 2010: 342ff). This puts 
Greece in an increasingly negative cycle of low export, high labour costs, low consumption and 
demand, low production, unemployment, which also leads to decreasing tax revenues etc. 
Following historical institutionalism as a theoretical approach, the EMU as an institution consists of 
routines and conventions, e.g. The Maastricht Treaty; many of these paths of the above stated 
routines and conventions leads back to the establishment of the EMU. As mentioned previously, the 
framework for the convergence criteria was formulated by the Delors Committee, which was 
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dominated by French and German interests, thus continuing an asymmetric power relation and 
creating competitive advantages for the core countries at the expense of the periphery countries. 
The sovereign debt crisis has, in this respect, as much its roots on German performance as it does in 
Greek performance (Lapavitsas et al. 2010: 330f).  
 
7.6. Concluding remarks 
All in all have the convergence criteria caused exhaustive austerity measures on Greece, as the 
criteria seem to be designed for an ideal economic union with very similar member countries; 
countries that should be like the core. However, as periphery countries, like Greece, that have very 
different economies have also been accepted into the EMU, the economic union is facing new 
challenges. This is seen in the Greek case, as the fiscal and monetary mechanisms that would be 
beneficial for Greece to use, in order to cope with price hikes, inflation, increasing unemployment 
and decreasing competitiveness in an open market, are not available to Greece. Greece has not been 
able to live up to the convergence criteria, partially because they did not have a government 
structure, administration and level of development fit to align with the European ideals. The criteria 
appear to accentuate core-periphery differences and help deteriorate the current situation in Greece. 
They also show how interconnected the economies become with a common currency, as most 
countries in the Eurozone by now will have felt the punch of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. Thus 
the restrictions imposed on Greece through the convergence criteria have to some extent proved to 
be sub-optimal.  
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ANALYSIS PART II 
 
8. Differences and similarities between Greece and Argentina 
In the following chapter the similarities between the Greek and Argentine crisis is analysed in order 
to be able to answer the research question of why Greece has not defaulted like Argentina did in 
2001. The chapter starts with an analysis of the internal similarities between Argentina and Greece, 
which is followed by an analysis of the external similarities between the two countries. Finally the 
chapter ends with the distinctions between Greece and Argentina. 
 
8.1. Internal similarities between Argentina and Greece 
A variety of similarities between Argentina and Greece exist, which is a part of what makes the 
comparison of the two countries interesting. Knowing the similarities will further help determine 
the differences that are expected to have influenced the Greek decision not to default, - yet. The 
following section analyses the internal similarities between Argentina and Greece, drawing on the 
structural elements presented separately in chapter 4 and 5 previously. It is attempted to include the 
reasons for these structural internal similarities and what the consequences in terms of sovereign 
room to manoeuvre and sovereign decisions may be on the financial crisis that Greece finds itself in 
at the moment. 
Greece joined the European Monetary Union (EMU) and adopted the euro in 2001, although not 
completely the same, this transition from the drachma to the euro is essentially equivalent to 
pegging to a hard currency as Argentina’s peg to the dollar, as it requires giving up monetary 
authority and certain fiscal adjustment mechanisms, such as the option to lead an expansionary 
fiscal policy (Nechio 2010: 1f). This loss of autonomy initially enhanced economic confidence and 
contributed to lower inflation and interest rates in both Greece and Argentina in the beginning of 
the pegs. However, this loss of authority over national monetary policy essentially also led both 
countries to parallel situations characterised by high debt levels, stagnant economies and 
implementation of IMF programmes with focus on fiscal adjustment, reforms and general austerity 
(Ibid.). In both countries the peg or the conversion to the euro, led to over-evaluations of the 
countries’ future income, understood as the income that the country is expected to be able to 
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generate (see chapter 4 on Argentina). This in turn led to an increased availability of foreign 
lending, or cash inflow, which increased Argentine and Greek borrowings, both in the public and 
private sector. Thereby the over-evaluation created a fake feeling of prosperity which led to over-
spending both in the public sector and privately, which in turn destroyed competitiveness. Thus, the 
build-up of government deficits, which essentially did or could lead to default, was a result of large 
increases in government spendings (Nechio 2010: 2).  
This is accentuated by the sudden change of role in the regional puzzle, for instance did the entry 
into the Eurozone leave Greece in a sort of vacuum between regions - this is elaborated in the 
section on external similarities on page 8.2. The internal effects that caused this vacuum was 
partially the demand for price stability from the EU (convergence criteria one), which inevitably led 
to increased wages in Greece, which in turn made production more expensive and eventually led to 
increased prices, decreasing Greece’s regional competitiveness. Additionally did the increased rate 
of inflation prior to the pegs worsen the competitiveness in both countries at the time. 
The developments after the peg in both countries
11
 appear to have led to growing middle classes, 
who were the primary debtors of foreign capital, usually a growing middle class would also lead to 
a growing presence of entrepreneurism and small businesses (Gatinois 2012). However, due to 
elaborated clientilism the bureaucracy in both countries was so comprehensive that it typically 
killed small businesses. This is evident in the “Ease to do Business” Index which the World Bank 
publishes every year. Here Greece was placed outside the top 100 countries, which is well below 
any other European country (Featherstone 2011: 198). Both Argentina and Greece are continuously 
ranked very low on this index, and in 2011 they feature as number 113 and 100 respectively (World 
Bank 2012), this indicates that the two governments had not made a good environment for 
entrepreneurism.  
However, this growing middle class with increased spending on houses and cars was vulnerable, 
and likely to include the ones that are hit the hardest by a default, as was the case in Argentina 
(Bolton-Shaw 2012). This poses an interesting, and similar dilemma in the two countries. 
According to the clientilistic characteristics mentioned throughout, the main electorate is the elite, 
which is why buying the elite’s support is of paramount importance. However, with a growing 
middle class their votes become of increasing importance to the politicians; thus the consequences 
                                                 
11
 See the chapter 4 and 5 on Argentina and Greece, for elaborations of these developments 
62 
 
of a default -or severe austerity measures imposed by the Troika - poses challenges to the 
politicians as neither will be popular with their electorate. Therefore, a default is also a sign as to 
whether politicians are thinking in terms of office-seeking short-term behaviour or in terms of 
policy-seeking long-term behaviour (Strom 1990). Precisely this is one of the dilemmas of the 
current Greek situation, as neither a default nor austerity measures are popular with the electorate.  
Thus can the entry in the Eurozone for Greece be seen as a critical juncture, since the entry has 
posed certain criteria and austerity measures which have had a large impact on the situation Greece 
is currently in.  
However, it is not only in terms of currency pegs that Argentina and Greece appear similar. Some 
of the internal reasons for the countries to end up in these very difficult financial situations stem 
back to history, and elements that were created post-World War Two have created a path dependent 
tendency and affected the countries’ current situations.  
One such very strong element, which has been recurring throughout this project, is the element of 
clientilism and following lack of reforms in both Argentina and Greece. In both countries the very 
elaborated form of clientilism, where politicians have to buy the support of oligarchs and trade 
unions in order to secure political support, has led to excessively large states with dominant elites. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the states expanded as a means of offering favours to the elite; 
favourable job positions were created for the elite, who then further infiltrated the public sector and 
gained further access to influence political decisions. One problem with this elaborated clientilism 
and extensive control in elite-hands is that the elite is likely to favour status quo. This means that in 
a developed system of clientilism, reforming the country becomes increasingly difficult, as it is very 
likely that the power elite does not want to give away any of their power. And as clientilism has 
been practised in Greece and Argentina for so long, the political systems were infiltrated with 
family members, who have received jobs, not primarily on their merits but primarily due to 
connections and favours (Featherstone 2001: 197). This in turn is likely to make the public sector 
even more inefficient, as the workforce may not be qualified for the jobs they are hired to do. 
adding to this the rigidity of the labour markets, where firing an employee is very difficult, the 
public sector is in danger of being very inefficient (Ibid.: 196) Thus change becomes difficult, as 
the elite constitutes the power centre both financially and politically, and this elite is not likely to 
give up easily. The increasing inflow of cash after the pegs made the potential for bribery, nepotism 
and favouring larger, and instead of using momentum to reform the countries, the cash inflow were 
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used to further sustain the existing systems (Polychroniou 2011: 6), in reality the sudden access to 
substantial amounts of cash, which the Eurozone-membership led to, supported clientilistic 
practices as it became increasingly beneficial to make agreements with the government as the bag 
of money increased. Initiating a clientilistic manor within the state apparatus is thus seen to lead to 
a path dependent asymmetric power relation, where only increased checks and balances by the 
remaining society are likely to be able to change status quo. It is a cyclic movement, of negative 
developments that follows from clientilism; as firstly power is placed asymmetrically with the elite. 
Secondly, this asymmetrical power leads to more favours and an inefficient public sector, which 
then removes politics from the remaining society as they have no feeling of participation. This in 
turn leads to manifestation of status quo, as a civil society that feels removed from politics and 
political influence is not likely to engage in the system and demand changes or checks and balances. 
This, of course, is a simplification of reality, but is in this project believed to be a cyclical process 
that manifests an endemic power relation in both countries. To change status quo it is estimated that 
it takes either a strong authoritative person, an uprising or a different kind of “shock to the system” 
- this could potentially be a sovereign debt crisis or a default (Kindleberger 2011: 156).   
The lack of reforms, possibly as a consequence of an elite favouring status quo, was also seen in 
Argentina, where President Menem refused to introduce labour market reforms and spending cuts in 
the public sector. This scenario is somewhat repeating itself in Greece, where essentially becoming 
a member of the Eurozone should lead to compliance with the convergence criteria of the 
Maastricht Treaty. But, although the first years of Greece’s Eurozone-membership seemed to be 
good for the country, which should have led to Greek reforms of the labour market and the public 
sector, as was the case in Argentina, Greece did not see such reforms. This affected their 
competitiveness and the place in the regional geography, which is elaborated in section 4. 
Add to the above is that fact that both countries were, and are, dependent on primary and secondary 
industries. Neither of these industries are particularly value-added, and do not generate income or 
development in the state. Thus instead of becoming first movers and create innovative industries 
that can compete, particularly Greece remains a peripheral industry that exports their goods to 
countries who then process the goods and adds more value to it.
12
 An example of this is production 
of olive oil. The oil is produced in Greece, then shipped to Italy where it is bottled and re-sold for a 
                                                 
12
 This follows the Krugman’s agglomeration model where he states that peripheral industries can either remain 
peripheral or be innovative and thereby become competitive (Schwartz chapters). 
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much higher price (DR2 Tema 2012). Thus, state income does not increase; rather, it is likely to 
decrease due to the loss of competitiveness which means that export decreases. A difficulty that 
both countries thus face is how to develop their industries in order to sustain incomes and become 
competitive in the long run.  
Last but not least, just prior to the Argentine default in 2001, Argentina saw declines in both 
economic growth and tax revenues. Between 1999 and 2001, the Argentine real GDP shrank by an 
average of 3%, where previously it had seen annual rises in real GDP (Nechio 2010: 2). The same is 
the situation in Greece, where several years of positive growth slowed down in 2008 and 2009, 
where the Greeks saw their GDP decreasing by 2% annually (Ibid.). Historically, the Greek 
governments have preferred to either increase taxes of sell out state assets rather than cut state 
spending, when they have faced a need for austerity (Featherstone 2011: 198). This is a problem in 
several aspects. First, when Greece sells out of, for instance their largest shipping port to Chinese 
investors,
13
 it essentially moves even further into dependency on primary industries and further 
away from one of their main income generating industries; shipping. This leads to less income, in 
the long term, even though it may generate some much needed income in the very short term 
perspective. Of course, the story about Chinese investors is not so single-facetted as described here, 
it also has advantages for Greece and Chinese investors are among the only investors to still risk 
money in Greece (Information 20.02.2012). Foreign direct investments have decreased by 38.3% 
between 2009 and 2010, posing a serious challenge to the Greek recovery, even in the face of 
further Troika lending and austerity measures (Ibid.). Secondly it appears to be challenging, as 
Greece, as described on p. 30, has huge problems with tax evasion. Expecting to generate income 
from a source where it historically has not been possible poses is a bit of a paradox, particularly as 
the tax payers’ incomes have been decreased substantially both generating less willingness to pay 
taxes, but more importantly not increasing taxes as lower salaries means lower taxes. Add to these 
elements in both countries that they both have fairly low labour competitiveness and high nominal 
wages which push up unemployment even further as high wages means higher production costs 
which means higher prices and thus lower demand, which in turn leads to lower production and thus 
a necessity to fire employees (Nechio 2010: 2). 
                                                 
13
 The Chinese company Cosco Pacific Ltd. has made an agreement with the Greek government to be responsible for 
the daily running of Greece’s largest port, Piraeus, for the next 35 years in return Greece was paid €4.3 mio. and Cosco 
pledged to invest more than €500 mio.  in modernisation and expansion of the Greek/Chinese shipping port 
(Information.dk 20.02.2012) 
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As the above has attempted to show, Greece and Argentina share important characteristics in terms 
of recession and defaults. The puzzle is why Argentina chose to default and Greece has not yet 
defaulted, when the countries’ system appear so relatively similar and both have faced substantial 
structural challenges and endemic difficulties. This is what will be elaborated in the next two 
chapters. 
 
8.2. External similarities: Argentina and Greece 
The following section will emphasize how Argentina and Greece are equal from an external point 
of view, i.e. how external elements have showed to have impact on the countries in equal manners. 
The attention will be drawn to the role of the EU and IMF and historically how Argentina’s and 
Greece’s roles at the regional level have changed.   
In a historical perspective Argentina and Greece due to internal deficiencies were granted financial 
loans and supporting programmes from the IMF and the EU respectively. In both cases the 
programmes came with demands and obligations such as liberalisations and reforms. As mentioned 
previously, to be part of the common currency, the euro, Greece promised commitment to adhering 
to the four convergence criteria of the EMU. At least every second year or on request from a 
member state, the European Commission and the ECB have to report to the Council, to which 
extent a member state satisfies the convergence criteria (europa.eu 2006B). Taking from this, the 
EU has had clear opportunities to follow and scrutinize to which extent Greece has met the 
convergence criteria throughout their membership years. In spite of this, Greece is currently in the 
middle of a sovereign debt crisis of proportions. Although Greece has followed liberalistic 
economic policies with privatisation, cuts in public expenses and tax cuts to the private 
sector, Greece still has problems meeting the convergence criteria (Information.dk 2009A). For 
some reason, the EU has not yet expelled Greece from the Eurozone. Some potential reasons for 
this are elaborated in the section on differences between Greece and Argentina.  
In the early 1990’s Argentina experienced a similar development, a change to a liberalist course 
with privatization programmes and IMF as an engaged external actor, who recommended structural 
adjustment programmes and labour market reforms. Subsequently the president in power Carlos 
Menem refused to implement crucial reforms. Meanwhile IMF did not make, or have success with 
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implementing, any sanctions, although Argentina did not meet all their recommendations. As is 
expressed by Akkerman et. al. (2003) the IMF made two errors in their collaboration with 
Argentina: 
“(a) the Fund failed to press Argentina hard enough on fiscal policy, especially during the period of 
rapid economic growth from 1995-97, and (b) that it went on too long providing financial support 
to Argentina” (p. 109) 
However, the path of the Greek case differs from the Argentine, as the structural conditions 
surrounding respectively the EU and the IMF interventions, as well as the timeline, differ in the two 
cases.  Both countries have shown a lack of responsibility before the crises turned into a sovereign 
debt crisis and subsequently a default in Argentina. The point is not that Greece and Argentina do 
not play a big part in the responsibility, rather that the EU and the IMF did not make sanctions 
before the tipping point. According to the historical institutionalist perspective the sovereign debt 
crisis in Greece and the default in Argentina, is a tipping point. The tipping point signifies that at 
the time when the debt crisis or the default emerged, it is a point of no return, as was elaborated on 
in chapter 2. At this moment Greece and Argentina did not have the option to change the path and 
avoid ‘disaster’. 
In the case of Argentina the IMF advised the Argentine government on a large number of fiscal 
programmes and thereby had an interest in borrowing money to the Latin American country, as the 
IMF is a bank and generates income from the interest rate that is paid on loans (IMF 2003: 64). 
The fact that Greece did not meet the convergence criteria during the euro membership is difficult 
for the EU and the core countries to change. The neoliberal euro-project is to build a single 
currency and a free and common market. Particularly the core has benefited from this as they, 
among other things, have made necessary reforms in order to compete with the dollar and thereby 
increase their own market share. 
Another external factor to be analyzed is the regional power relation. In both countries, they were 
historically important and large players in their regional setting, they also both saw extensive 
internal conflicts during the post-World War years. Additionally, the deteriorating financial 
situation has for both countries meant a shift in their regional importance. To Argentina it meant 
that it could no longer compete with the low prices and low wages in neighbouring countries, 
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neither could they completely compete with Brazil. To Greece, becoming a member of the 
Eurozone has meant that they have been caught between cheap working force in the East and value-
added industry in the West. Where Greece before the Eurozone membership to some extent could 
compete and be on par with the cheap Eastern European countries, becoming a member of the EU 
and demands such as price stability meant that Greek prices went up, initiating an upward spiral of 
prices and production costs. On the other hand, Greece does not have sufficiently developed 
industries to compete with the highly value-added industries in the Western European countries, nor 
was it appealing to follow German strategies and undertake wage-dumping. This is accentuated 
through a view at Greece’s main industries: shipping and agriculture, and to some extent tourism. A 
lack of labour market reforms has meant that they have not gained competitiveness and are 
therefore not capable of changing their position in the regional power play.  
 
8.3. Distinctions between Greece and Argentina 
It has in previous sections been highlighted how similar Greece and Argentina are internally and to 
some extend also externally.  
This section will discuss the external differences between the two countries which finally will lead 
us to the answer of why Greece is acting like they are in their current sovereign debt crisis. Initially, 
the differences between the Argentine and the Greek crises are briefly emphasized. This is followed 
by a more in-depth analysis of the different situation Greece find itself in compared to Argentina, 
where the main divergence is Greece as a member of the EU and the EMU. 
As mentioned earlier did both countries peg their weak currencies to a strong currency in the hope 
of obtaining economic advantages. In the case of Argentina it was a domestic decision, and the 
Argentine peg to the dollar did not carry much interest to the US. Furthermore as Argentina was not 
part of an economic union, Argentine missteps would mostly affect themselves – although, the 
economy is global and very interconnected, and a default is bound to have widespread effects.  
In Greece’s situation it was different; here there was a mutual interest between the EU and Greece 
in accepting Greece as a member of the EMU. Both actors (EU and Greece) saw from different 
perspectives Greece’s entry in the EMU as a positive achievement. The EMU consisted at the time 
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of eleven other member states who were positive about the venture with Greece, after the Council’s 
approval of the Convergence Report from ECB and EC. EU saw the Greek entry, as part of further 
integration and enlargement which was seen to strengthen the legitimacy of the EU. The intention 
of the European integration project with a common currency, was to strengthen the EU globally, 
and thereby the euro. (Lapavitsas et. al 2010: 342). Greece on the other hand saw their entry as 
access to structural programme funding, cheap borrowing and most of all symbolic transformation 
to democracy, as addressed earlier.  
Contrary to Argentina, Greece is part of an economic and monetary union, with obligations as well 
as implications, including EU’s four Convergence criteria, which has been emphasized earlier in the 
analysis I, chapter 7.  
The conditions surrounding the Argentine peg and the IMF's criteria in their loans, provides the 
essential distinction to the Greek case. IMF’s criteria in Argentina did only imply that the 
government kept their public deficit down (Akkerman et al. 2003: 107).  
As it has previously been clarified in (see chapter 7), three of the convergence criteria is; that 
Greece has to keep their nominal interest-rate, prices and exchange rate stable in order to hinder 
inflation. Especially the last mentioned, exchange rate, is one of the central mechanisms, which has 
excluded Greece the possibility to devalue their currency, and thereby a pivotal difference between 
the crises in Greece and Argentina.  
In the following, the power relations within the EU and the Troika are further elaborated. The 
power relations will also to some extent explain why Greece has not yet exited the EU and 
defaulted.  
The Troika has in the past two years provided several bailouts in order for Greece to reduce its 
massive public debt, with adjustment structural programmes and strict austerity measures the Troika 
has set the tone. The austerity measures include wage and pension cuts, increased taxes and around 
150.000 lost jobs (guardian.co.uk 2011)  
With the path dependency of the EMU in mind, the policies of the ECB are attached to the EMU. 
Collectively they constitute one single monetary policy across the Eurozone, which has tremendous 
power over monetary, fiscal and labour market areas, as member states have to follow the line 
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dictated in the criteria and by the ECB (Lapavitsas et al. 2010: 322). With policies that include low 
inflation, encouraging liberalization and providing bailouts in Greece’s sovereign debt crisis, ECB's 
policy has been in line with the European neoliberal project. In addition the ECB has in its policies 
taken financial interests into account (Lapavitsas et al. 2010: 322f). 
The first bailout introduced by the Troika was directed to Greece, however in reality it was aimed at 
banks (Lapavitsas et al. 2010: 2f). The ECB has provided liquidity to banks, and it has also started 
acquiring Greece and other periphery countries public debt with the aim of relieving the pressures 
on banks. State intervention has temporarily calmed down markets but not resolved the crisis 
resolutely. Still European banks hold large volumes of Greek debt, while simultaneously facing 
funding problems (Ibid). All this is a path dependent track which leads back to the construction of 
the EMU, as the EMU has created a gap between periphery and core, and Greece and the EU are 
now facing the results of that: 
"The truth is that [the] economic and monetary union has failed, not least because it has 
created an unsustainable gap between core and periphery. For peripheral countries, 
EMU membership is likely to be a source of stagnation and income inequality. For 
Greece it has already been a failure of historic proportions" (guardian.co.uk 2011) 
To close the inefficient gap to the core and to restore its competitiveness, Greece will possibly have 
to exit the Eurozone (ft.com 2011). The ECB and particularly the German government, led by 
Angela Merkel, are important actors in the power structure of the Eurozone as well as in the Troika 
(Ibid). If Greece accepts the bailout and austerity measures, paradoxically Greece will be bankrupt 
with a sovereign debt on 160 % of GDP in 2015 according to the Troika's own calculations. At the 
time the default emerges, it will be the European taxpayer, who will pay the price, as the banks will 
be out (Ibid.). The above explains the power relation and thereby an interest in Greece staying in the 
Eurozone, and thereby do not default now.  
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9. Conclusion 
This project set out to analyse why Greece in the light of their current sovereign debt crisis has not 
followed the same path as Argentina did in 2001 and defaulted. Subsequently the project aimed at 
drawing conclusions, from a historical institutional perspective, on the macroeconomic framework 
in the Eurozone, and the consequences being a member of the Eurozone may pose. 
The project found that the main difference between Greece and Argentina is Greece’s membership 
of the Eurozone. This membership includes adherence to the Maastricht convergence criteria. These 
express demands which all member states must fulfil, and the demands essentially mean that a 
default is not a solution for Greece, unless they decide to completely exit the Eurozone.  
An exit from the Eurozone would both mean harsh consequences for Greece in terms of a bankrupt 
state, and a civil society paying the price, a stop to all cash inflows in terms of loans, EU’s 
agricultural subsidies, investments, inter alia. It would further lead to a loss of all trading partners 
as well as a loss in security and confidence in the Greek economy, such a confidence-loss would 
further extend the period of time where foreign direct investments are low. On the other hand, a 
Greek Eurozone-exit would probably have a domino effect in the Eurozone, potentially leading to 
the end of the Eurozone as we know it. Additionally, the core countries have an interest in keeping 
Greece in the Eurozone as the common market means that the core can make use of competitive 
advantages. This indicates asymmetrical power relations, also portrayed in the convergence criteria. 
The analysis suggests that the demand for price stability in the convergence criteria has affected 
Greece negatively, in terms of decreased competitiveness and unemployment, because they had to 
borrow money from the core in order to by at a high stable “euro-price”. It was further found that 
the second criterion concerning a close to fixed exchange rate is critical to countries in a economic 
crisis like Greece, since Greece’s high exchange rates have affected Greek export negatively, and 
they have been outmatched by core countries like Germany. Relating to this it was found that 
Germany does not want other Eurozone countries to devaluate, since this would induce a loss in 
their own competitiveness. The third convergence criteria concerning the freezing of the interest 
rate at a low level is likely to be part of the reason why both the Greek public and private sector 
could borrow enormous amounts of money before the crisis, which is part of the reason why Greece 
is currently in a sovereign debt crisis. It cannot be disagreed that convergence criteria are desirable, 
- but it might not be possible in a monetary system of states at different economic levels. 
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The asymmetrical power relation apparent in the convergence criteria was initiated in a path 
dependent process which started at the establishment of firstly the Coal and Steel Union, but more 
importantly in the development of the EMU. The interests of core countries have continuously 
gained more leverage, due to the fact that the European Union started out as a core-country project. 
This initiated the path dependent process, still affecting the framework for the EU to this day. This 
indicates that the core countries have gained certain advantages by having established themselves as 
core in the initial European framework, contrary to periphery countries that can only adjust existing 
decision and not introduce a new framework. Additionally it was found that the foundation of the 
EMU was based on sovereign, rather than united, interests, which might explain some of the reason 
why Greece and other periphery countries are facing huge debt crisis.  
In the comparison of Argentina and Greece it became clear that there was a vast amount of internal 
similarities between the countries, e.g. clientilism, a large public sector and a currency peg, which 
collectively led to massive loans and excessive spending. However, one determining external 
difference, which also affects internal conditions, was found. Namely, Greece’s membership of the 
EMU. As mentioned above, this has severe restrictions on Greek monetary flexibility and 
essentially determines whether they can default or not.  
The severity of the Greek sovereign debt crisis is mirrored in the bailout packages financed by the 
Troika – the EC, the ECB and the IMF and private banks in the core. The Greek loans, with which 
they can pay off previous debt, in exchange for substantial austerity measures within Greece, shows 
the mutual interest in keeping Greece in the Eurozone. However, it remains to be determined how 
far both the European and the Greek patience and willingness to co-operate will stretch. A Greek 
Eurozone-exit and default does not appear to be off the table. 
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